INDIAN SECURITY : HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT HONESTLY OR PERISH - THE BIG INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE

SOURCE:
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-military-india-defence-manohar-parrikar/





      INDIAN  GEO POLTICAL SECURITY : 
    HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT                     SQUARELY & HONESTLY 
                                   OR
                               PERISH 
                             THE BIG 
    INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE

THE BIG  INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE

 

PM has a bold vision for defence reform. 

Can his Defence Minister deliver?

                                   BY

                   

                       Anit Mukherjee

     The writer is an assistant professor at the 

     S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies,

     Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

 Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Defence Minister 

                                    Manohar Parrikar

The terrorist attacks on Pathankot Air Force Base 

revealed weaknesses in our intelligence, police and 

security procedures. While all of them need to be 

addressed, however there are larger issues—which can 

have far more disastrous consequences for India’s 

national security, which need attention. This is the issue 

of defence reforms—initiated in the aftermath of the 

1999 Kargil war (which followed from a previous Lahore 

yatra by a BJP Prime Minister to meet Nawaz Sharif), 

virtually ignored by the two UPA governments and 

brought to life by the current government. Indeed, in an 

important speech, while addressing the Combined 

Commanders Conference last month Prime Minister 

Modi challenged his defence minister and senior 

military commanders to reform their “beliefs, doctrines, 

objectives and strategies.” This is nothing less than 

appealing for a paradigm shift, on a number of different 

fronts, echoing the sentiments of generations of military 

reformers. The Defence Minister, who has publicly 

supported defence reform, has his task cut out for him. 

Unfortunately he should not count on support from 

civilian bureaucrats in his Ministry. In turn, it is far from 

assured whether the current generation of senior 

military officers are up to this task. In short, while the 

prime minister’s vision is bold, its implementation faces 

formidable obstacles. The attacks in Pathankot should 

remind him—and his security managers, that India lives 

in a dangerous neighbourhood and it should therefore 

focus on strengthening our military.

It is an open secret that former Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh was keen to undertake some form of 

defence reforms. His office was the driving force behind

 the Naresh Chandra Committee, established in 2011, 

ostensibly to revisit the defence reforms process. This 

committee recommended the creation of a Permanent 

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee—a less than

perfect nomenclature for the Chief of Defence Staff. For 

the first time ever all three service chiefs supported 

creating such a post. However, Defence Minister A.K. 

Anthony, for reasons not entirely clear, was not that 

enthusiastic. Civilian bureaucrats in his ministry also 

shared his scepticism. Later, numerous controversies 

surrounding General V.K. Singh put paid to any talk of 

defence reforms.

Prime Minister Modi identified six broad areas for 

reforms—in defence planning, enhancing jointness (the 

ability of the army, navy and air force to operate 

together), urging manpower rationalization (smaller 

tooth to tail ratio), emphasizing professional military 

education, restructuring higher defence management 

and in the defence procurement process. His analysis of 

problems in each of these sectors challenged the 

assumptions, and world-view, of India’s senior military 

commanders. For instance, India is probably the only 

country in the world which is expanding its military 

manpower which, by definition, curtails resources for 

military modernization (China recently announced cuts 

of up to 300,000 troops). The Indian military is among 

the least ‘joint’ major militaries in the world and its 

system of professional military education emphasizes 

training over education. However, like with so many of 

the prime minister’s project, the most important issue is 

that of implementation. If this initiative is left to the 

bureaucracies—civilian or military, then reforms are 

unlikely to succeed.

Conventional wisdom would have the government 

announcing reform measures and leaving it to the 

military and the defence ministry to implement them. 

Doing so will likely subvert the reforms, as has 

happened in the past. In 1986, Arun Singh was 

instrumental in creating a tri-services and joint civil-

military institution called the Defence Planning Staff 

(DPS) in an attempt to rationalise defence planning. It 

quickly lost its relevance as the services opposed this 

initiative. More recently, the Ajai Vikram Singh 

Committee was tasked to find way to lower the age of 

combatant commanders. However, the implementation 

of the committee report was left to the services. In the 

army this created a major controversy—which is 

currently being battled in the courts. The Andaman and 

Nicobar Joint Command, which was founded to be an 

experiment in jointness has, in practice, been 

“subverted” by a non-cooperative attitude from the 

services. Finally, there is a variance between the report 

submitted by the late K. Subrahmanyam (under the 

aegis of the Committee on National Defence University) 

on India’s Defence University and how it is currently 

being implemented by the military. In sum, reforms will 

not succeed if its implementation is not closely 

monitored.

There are three significant obstacles to defence

 reforms. First, it is not clear if, and how, will the Chiefs 

of the three services give up powers for the proposed 

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). If the restructuring of 

higher defence management results in an institutionally 

weak CDS then it defeats the purpose. Second, it is not 

clear how the government will create more joint 

commands, especially since this is opposed by the 

military. Their opposition, shorn of its elegance, is 

primarily because it curtails the number of posts 

available for their upward mobility. It is not surprising 

therefore that they will advocate for more joint 

commands—Cyber, Space, Special Forces for instance, 

but will be unwilling to integrate existing commands. 

Effectiveness and efficiency is therefore sacrificed to 

the logic of bureaucratic expansion and increased 

promotion pathways. Third, there is opposition, usually 

in private, from civilian bureaucrats who do not want to 

change the status quo. They prefer the existing 

arrangement which gives them considerable powers 

 little accountability.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar—responsible for 

implementing the prime minister’s vision, has claimed 

that he has read the Goldwater Nichols Act, which 

transformed the U.S. military. However, this initiative did 

not occur overnight and was preceded by a public 

debate and, perhaps more importantly, required a civil-

military partnership consisting of reform minded 

individuals. As he faces obstacles from his own officials 

perhaps Mr. Parrikar should consider forming a Defence 

Reforms Unit comprising politicians, former officials 

and technocrats all sharing the vision for defence 

reforms. This could thereby monitor the progress of 

different reform measures.

The media is fond of comparing the leadership styles of 

President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi. It is 

surely a coincidence that both have publicly come out 

with statements calling for reforming their militaries. We 

therefore have the unique opportunity to compare two 

different institutional and leadership styles. It would be 

India’s loss if, after a year, defence reforms remains an 

aspiration.

Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU in Singapore.