ISLAMIZATION OF EURPE : THE SNAKE

SOURCE:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yeJ-iv3MOTo



                                    ISLAMIZATION OF EURPE

                                                              THE SNAKE

                  
                         


 This is really worth watching. The rotten and cowardly so-called news media is suppressing this, but it’s exactly what the US of A public needs to understand.


“The Snake" is going viral in Europe. Donald Trump began reciting the lyrics to a song entitled The Snake at his rallies a few weeks ago.Naturally this was not reported by the liberal mainstream media.

The following video is making its way all over Europe. And it should be in the US.
https://www.youtube.com/embed/yeJ-iv3MOTo?rel=0

WATER :Indus Water Treaty: Next Victim of Water Wars?

SOURCE:
http://www.asianwarrior.com/

WATER :Indus Water Treaty: Next Victim of Water Wars?



[http://www.asianwarrior.com/2016/01/indus-water-treaty-next-victim-of-water-wars-part-i.html

 

 

This article is Part 1 in a 2 Part series covering the historic Indus Water Treaty (IWT). With the world facing an acute water shortage and water crisis being inevitable in the future, this treaty is cited as a model of cooperation between two sworn enemies that has even stood through three wars and a prolonged low intensity conflict. Will this continue to be the same in the future or will it become a victim of Water Wars? This gets more alarming in the India-Pakistan context when one adds the issue of dispute over Indus waters to the historical Kashmir dispute between the two nuclear armed countries which may become a potential trigger for a future war in the subcontinent. 

In the first decade since Partition of India in1947, one of the most intractable issues left over was the sharing of river and canal waters. What was developed as a single irrigation system over millennia had to be divided between two Sovereign States and to make matters worse, the waters in question flowed through Kashmir, a region that had led to armed conflict soon in the formative years of the two states and repeatedly after. It took the good offices of the World Bank to negotiate a fair and acceptable treaty for the sharing of the waters of the Indus River System between India and Pakistan.

The Indus river system consists of the Indus River and its major tributaries that include Kabul, Kurram, Swat, Jhelum and Chenab rivers in the West and Ravi, Beas and Sutlej in the East. The Indus originates near the Mansarovar Lake and travels through Tibet before entering India in the South-Eastern part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Thereafter, it passes through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and then Pakistan before finally draining into the Arabian Sea near Karachi.

However, lately there have been a lot of stresses and strains on the treaty that may make water sharing a politically charged issue between India and Pakistan, possibly even overtaking the issue of Kashmir as the primary source of conflict. Though there is a lack of mutual trust and accommodative spirit between India and Pakistan on most bilateral issues including sharing of water, it is in the interest of both countries to resolve all issues of water sharing on a technical basis within the consultative and reconciliatory framework provided in the IWT rather than letting these be taken over by political or emotional narratives.

History

Before Partition, The British developed an elaborate system of irrigation canals in the Indus basin in the 19th century. Most of the canals were constructed in the provinces of Punjab and Sind. However, each province built its own works independently due to lack of an integrated approach. Due to a lack of storage facilities, competition for the run-of-river flow increased and led to a dispute between Sind and Punjab in the 1930s. Events leading to the Partition obstructed any final settlement of the dispute. Upon Partition, India became the upper riparian in all five rivers of the Indus Water Basin in Punjab due to the location of headworks on the Indian side of the international boundary. The standstill agreement lapsed on 31 March 1948 and India stopped the water supply to Pakistan on 01 Apr 1948 due to nonpayment of revenue. This is considered to be the start point of the escalation of the dispute as it created a fear psychosis in the minds of Pakistan that India could hold Pakistan to ransom on the issue of water. The two countries signed a temporary Inter Dominion Agreement (also called the Delhi Agreement) in May 1948 to maintain the pre-partition status quo n water sharing till resolution of the dispute over revenue payment. However, India and Pakistan failed to resolve the dispute at a bilateral level due to lack of trust and political will on account of hardened domestic opinions. Pakistan wanted to escalate the dispute by referring it to the International Court of Justice which was rejected by India. On 01 Nov 1949, Pakistan declared the Delhi Agreement to be null and void and stopped making revenue payments with effect from July 1950. However, India continued to supply water to Pakistan without any disruption.

The World Bank’s Involvement

India and Pakistan had both applied for loans from the World Bank for development of works on the disputed waters of Sutlej, which were initially rejected. Later, the World Bank President, Eugene R. Black visited India and Pakistan and proposed the formation of a joint working group of engineers from India, Pakistan and the World Bank. He was of the view that the issue of sharing / division of water should be treated from a ‘functional’, rather than a political perspective. India wanted to use the eater flowing through its territory to develop its own irrigation network. Pakistan was concerned about the resultant damage to its existing usage and the need to ensure uninterrupted supply of water for agriculture. As the negotiations were not making any headway, the World Bank put forward its own settlement proposals in Feb 1954, offering the three Eastern Rivers to India and the three Western Rivers to Pakistan. Under the proposed plan, Pakistan had to construct replacement works to channelize the waters of the western rivers to compensate for the loss of waters of the eastern rivers. The World Bank proposed that India should bear the cost of replacement works in Pakistan. While Pakistan wanted the Indian financial liability to cover the cost of all transfer works as well as developmental works, the huge financial liability of USD 1.2Billion was not acceptable to India. The World Bank President then proposed a solution as per which, India was required to pay a fixed sum of £62.060Million in ten equal yearly installments while the Bank would raise additional funds for Pakistan with the help of Western donor countries. The donors pledged an additional $900Million, clearing the way for the conclusion of the treaty.

Given the inimical and belligerent attitude of India and Pakistan, the mediation by the World Bank acted as a facilitator for continued engagement and negotiations. The World Bank was able to leverage its position as the principal financer to both nations in taking the negotiations ahead. In addition, mid-course correction by the World Bank proposing division of rivers rather than joint development was able to break the deadlock created due to differing positions of India and Pakistan on the sharing of the waters. Intervention by the USA and other developed countries by the way of supporting the World Bank efforts for settlement of the dispute gave the necessary impetus to the negotiation process. In addition, financial contributions by international donors to the Indus Basin Development Fund was an important pre-requisite for the treaty as India and Pakistan were not in a position to bear the huge cost of replacement and development works involved.

The treaty was signed in Karachi between the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the Pakistani President Field Marshal Ayub Khan, along with the World Bank President W.A.B Illif, in September 1960. It was deemed effective from 01 Apr 1960 but was only ratified by the two governments later in January 1961.

When analyzing any treaty, it is imperative that both sides must be given equal weightage along with a similar cost-benefit ratio in order to have a balanced perspective. Policy making is relatively easy but history is witness that when the vision has been myopic, it has only led to long term strife rather than a clear acceptable long term solution. After all, Geopolitics is very dynamic and balances of power can drastically change by the turn of the decade. However, mutual acrimony aside, it’s important to separate facts from paranoia.

An Uneasy Partnership

The Partition of India left Pakistan as the lower riparian with most of the headworks on the Indian side. The experience of India shutting off water in 1948 led to the issue of water security and availability, assuming great importance for Pakistan since its inception making it both an emotive and a political issue during an already sensitive time.

Indus basin accounts for nearly 65% of water available in Pakistan. As an agrarian economy which follows ‘flood irrigation’ techniques, Pakistan relies heavily on the Indus waters for sustaining its population and irrigation needs. A bulk of Pakistan’s settled population depends upon the Indus and its tributaries for sustenance. The lower riparian states of Sindh and Balochistan have been accusing the Punjab province of Pakistan of gross misappropriation and over utilization of the river waters, leading to inter province rivalry within Pakistan and consequent water politics. The dams on the Indus Rivers have been conspicuous sources of conflict amongst the states in mainland Pakistan and a source of discontent amongst the people of PoK.

The political hierarchy of the country leaves no opportunity in linking the shortage of water to the alleged violations of the IWT by India. In addition, terrorist organizations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba have also found a scapegoat in India for the growing water scarcity in Pakistan. Hafiz Saeed of the Lashkar-e-Taiba has warned that “Muslims dying of thirst would drink the blood of India.”

Pakistan’s fears that India may dry out the rivers before reaching Pakistan by manipulating the storage facilities in various projects are unrealistic as all major Indian projects including the Baglihar Dam are located well inside the Indian Territory and any attempts to dry out the rivers or tributaries will first affect the Indian downstream projects. Moreover, the treaty specifies the maximum and minimum daily/weekly releases from the projects. This has never been violated by India even during wars. In fact, Indus has shown a markedly increased flow over the last decade which belies Pakistani claim of shortages.

Pakistan also fears that India may flood areas in Pakistan by opening gates of Pondage Facility; however due to the physical location of major India projects; the devastation due to flooding will primarily affect areas on the Indian side with minimal damage on the Pakistani side. Releases from run-of-the-river projects cannot cause major floods downstream. It also states that India is violating the IWT by undertaking too many Hydroelectric and Water Storage Projects on the Western Rivers. The IWT permits India to create capacity to store up to 3.6MAF water, number of projects being immaterial. Detailed specifications of hydropower projects by India on Western Rivers as laid down in the IWT have been strictly adhered to. Thus, the Pakistani claim is more political than technical. Its other bizarre claim that India is stealing the Indus Waters, leading to water crisis in Pakistan has been negated by former Pakistani Foreign Minister SM Qureshi, who has said in a TV interview on a Pakistani channel that Pakistan’s water problems are a result of inefficient irrigation and water management, not because of India.
Pakistan’s basic premise since the commencement of negotiations has been that the distribution of Indus waters between India and Pakistan should be based on the theory of ‘Historical Use’ as it sought to gain from the extensive development of canal system in areas of West Pakistan during British rule. However, as a result of the IWT, Pakistan had to let go of its rights over the three Eastern Rivers. So far, Pakistan has attempted to disrupt all such Indian projects by raising unqualified objections. The narrative of the water dispute has been hijacked by politicians. Sardar Asaf Ali, former advisor to the Pakistani Prime Minister has said, “The impending issues over sharing river water between India and Pakistan could trigger a war. Pakistan could pull out of IWT if India does not stop violating the treaty by construction of new dams on Indus River”. Most of the Indus Rivers receive 70-80 percent of water during the monsoon months which requires dams and storage works to achieve optimum utilization. As Pakistan is not in a position to build storage dams on the Western rivers due to geographical challenges, a huge amount of water goes waste into the Arabian Sea. In addition, the monsoons are generally accompanied by huge floods which cause loss of crops and infrastructure in rural Pakistan. As per Food and Agriculture Organization estimates, approximately 21 percent of arable land in Pakistan suffers from salinity and water logging due to excess waters in the Indus basin and the practice of flood irrigation techniques.

India has maintained a position of absolute sovereignty over all Indus waters in its own territory as per the ‘Harmon Doctrine’ and thus stopped the release of Indus waters to Pakistan over nonpayment of revenue once the Standstill Agreement lapsed. The primary Indian concern soon after independence was to exploit the potential of its river basins for development of agriculture and it has always stood by the provisions of the IWT in letter and spirit and continues to do so. India also believes that the Permanent Indus Commission is the best forum to resolve all bilateral disputes related to sharing of Indus waters. There is however there is a serious debate amongst the strategic thinkers and experts in India on the need to abrogate or modify the IWT for better exploitation of the common water resources.

Modification of IWT

Some analysts in India opine that India should leverage its position as the upper riparian to get Pakistan to act on other contentious issues. They argue that Pakistan has not violated the IWT like it did to the treaties of Shimla and Lahore only because of its disadvantageous position of being the lower riparian. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the USA and Panchsheel by China are quoted as precedents. India has been forced to function within the restrictive provisions of the IWT and has failed to exploit the hydroelectric opportunities over Jhelum and Chenab Rivers over Pakistani objections to every single project planned by India. Some argue that the signing of the IWT by Mr. Nehru had as an unstated quid pro quo, the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. As the upper riparian, India enjoys a substantial leverage which it has never exploited or even threatened to exploit despite grave provocations from Pakistan. Mr. MS Menon, an Indian security expert says that the IWT is more favourable to Pakistan since it got 80% of Indus waters even though the Indus Rivers chart a large part of their course in India. According to him, India should have got more than 40% of the total waters of the Indus basin and that India should move the World Bank for an overall review of the IWT.

The IWT needs to be renegotiated in order to optimize water utilization by both countries. Optimal utilization of Indus waters can only be done by ‘Integrated Basin Management’ by both countries. Though the initial World Bank proposal envisaged this, but it had to be dropped due to lack of mutual trust as also the politicization of the issue. Through Article VII of IWT that deals with future cooperation, India and Pakistan recognized their common stake in development of Indus river basin in the most optimal manner and committed themselves to cooperate in all fields, including engineering works. However, no action towards joint development has occurred. The essence of the proposed IWT-II centers on joint management of future schemes and optimization of basin plans in Western rivers. Due to geographical constraints, Pakistan cannot build dams on Western rivers while India isn’t allowed to do so by the IWT, resulting in under-utilization of Indus waters. The proposal envisages India being allowed to build storage dams on the upper Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to utilize the waters jointly.

There is a growing demand from the Indian state of J&K to annul the IWT since it prohibits them from exploiting the potential of water resources for irrigation, energy and transport. The state of J&K has a hydroelectric power potential of 20,000 MW.  However, due to restrictions on storage of water of the Western Rivers, the state imports 80% of its power requirement from neighbouring states. The Indian attempts of sharing Ravi River’s water with J&K too have been unsuccessful. It is estimated that more than 200,000 hectares of agricultural land in J&K has remained un-irrigated despite the technical feasibility of utilizing water from Jhelum River on the Indian side. The J&K State Legislative Assembly adopted a resolution in 2002 calling for the abrogation of IWT. Sections of state media also reported that the state is suffering a loss of approximately Rs80 billion per annum on account of import of electricity. Mr. BG Verghese, a prominent water expert has opined that one of the main reasons for Pakistan to seek the state of J&K is that the headworks of the major Indus Rivers are located in J&K and POK. By abrogating the treaty, India may end up strengthening the Pakistani claims on J&K.

Some strategists have proposed certain formulae based on exchange of territory in the state of Jammu and Kashmir to ensure long term water security. One such formula is the ‘Chenab Formula. This was proposed by Sir Owen Dixon, a UN representative for India and Pakistan in 1950. It assigned Ladakh to India, Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) TO Pakistan, split Jammu between the two countries and proposed a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley. Contrary to the ‘visible’ demand for Kashmir Valley, parts of Jammu in the Chenab formula explain Pakistan’s compulsion to secure the control over the Indus Rivers. Similarly, the ‘Vale as the Base Formula’ envisages control of the vale of Kashmir by Pakistan by waging proxy war, to secure the Indus waters.

The potential advantages of an IWT-II cannot be denied; the lack of trust between India and Pakistan may not let it come into existence in the foreseeable future since the basic proposal of dam construction by India would mean a loss of control by Pakistan over Western rivers. This may not be politically acceptable in Pakistan. This is further underlined by the fact that India and Pakistan have not taken any steps towards joint development of the Indus river basin despite such provisions existing in the IWT. The IWT is an international agreement signed after prolonged negotiations. It will be detrimental to its international credibility if India were to walk out, especially since the treaty has stood the test of time for over 5 decades. Additionally, mere abrogation without any follow up agreement on water sharing will be counter-productive since the genuine requirements of the lower riparian cannot be wished away. Hence, abrogation is not a viable option



                                        PART- II
 [http://www.asianwarrior.com/2016/01/indus-water-            treaty-next-victim-of-water-wars-part-ii.html]
             

Continued from part – 1

 

 This article is the final article in a 2 Part series covering the historic Indus Water Treaty (IWT). In the previous part, we have explored the dynamics of India and Pakistan with reference to IWT.  We will continue and appraise the IWT with norms of international laws and conventions on sharing of international river basins. There are a total of 261 river basins in the world which are shared by co-riparians. Due to the lack of a universal agency to enforce the water sharing mechanism between states, international and conventions on water sharing are difficult to implement.

Generally, the upper riparian states claim absolute territorial sovereignty, with the right to use and exploit the waters in their own territory without any consideration of the effect of such use and exploitation on the lower riparians. Lower riparians claim the absolute integrity of the river, claiming that upper riparians have no right to take any action that alters the quality/quantity of water in the basin. The contradiction of these two stands results in inordinate delays in resolution of disputes related to sharing of water between co-riparians.

IWT vs. International Laws and Conventions

 

The Rule of Equitable Utilization was codified by the UNGA in May 1997 as the first principle of water sharing in Article 5. This rule enjoins the co-riparian states to utilize and international water course in an equitable and reasonable manner. It gives the right to each co-riparian to participate in protections, use and development of all international water basins in an equitable manner.

Besides the Principle of Equitable Distribution, the UN Convention also accepted the second principle of water sharing called the ‘No-Harm Rule’ in Article 7. This rule seeks to protect the existing uses of water. Though it may appear contradictory to the first rule of equitable utilization, the UN Convention has clarified that the Law of Equitable Utilization takes precedence over the No-Harm Rule.

Equitable sharing of waters of an international river basin is not easy to define. However, certain guidelines have been laid down in Article 6 of the UN Convention as under:

1. Natural character to include geography, hydrography, hydrology, ecology, climate etc.
2. Economic and social status and needs of the co-riparians.
3. Implications and effects of use(s) of water basin by one co-riparian on other(s).
4. Present and future potential uses of the water basin.
5. Protection, conservation and development of water resources in a cost effective and economic manner.
6. Whether alternatives to a particular type of water use are available.

All disputes are to be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and all parties must agree to doing so as also accept the court’s verdict. Since every country treats water as a strategic resource there is always reluctance in referring it to the ICJ. The IWT was the first international water sharing treaty negotiated with the help of a neutral third party and at the time of signing, the UN Convention of 1997 was not in vogue. Thus the application and implementation of international water sharing laws always remains a question mark with the UN.

Comparison of IWT with other Water Sharing Treaties

 

Treaties on sharing of international river basins vary based on the following parameters-The no. of parties to the agreement (Bilateral/Multilateral), territorial extent (Entire basin or part of it),subject matter of cooperation (data collection, allocation, planning, construction works etc.) and intensity of cooperation, ranging from sharing of information to joint planning and implementation of common developmental projects and programs. Based on the above mentioned parameters, the major water sharing treaties can be classified into following categories:

1. The Most Committed and More Cooperative Basins- this includes basins like Niger (nine members) and Rio Grande / Colorado (two members). The Niger River Commission is a multipurpose institution with broad authority over the entire basin for areas of data collection, navigation, irrigation, development, hydropower and environmental monitoring. In the case of Rio Grande / Colorado, the International Boundary and Water Commission manage the two basins as well as the border between the USA and Mexico. The commission has developed a unique and equitable approach and deals with all aspects governing water quality and sanitation, flood control and water allocation. Over the years, it has expanded its jurisdiction due to the high level of cooperation between the two states.
2. River Basins with Medium Levels of Cooperation- in this category, the co-riparian states cooperate only in certain specific areas, e.g. Elbe River Basin. The International Commission for the Protection of River Elbe has the narrow mandate of ensuring water quality for drinking water supply and irrigation.
3. River Basins with Least Cooperative Regimes- the Indus and Ganges-Brahmaputra river basins have cooperation regimes restricted to very narrowly defined areas. In the case of the 1996 treaty on sharing of Ganges waters between India and Bangladesh at Farakka. The treaty refers to a single use i.e. how much Ganges water will be used by India and Bangladesh in various seasons in order to ensure that India has enough water to flush the port of Kolkata. In case of the IWT, the jurisdiction of the Indus commission is restricted only to inspection and monitoring as India and Pakistan utilize their water resources individually and there is no joint management of the basin.

Thus, it can be seen that an elaborate framework of cooperation without mutual trust and willingness to cooperate doesn’t guarantee the success of water sharing treaties. On the other hand, the Elbe basin is a successful model of cooperation despite a narrower mandate of cooperation due to willingness and trust between the co-riparians. However, the IWT is considered a successful treaty as Indian and Pakistan, with their bitter history of conflict and mistrust, needed to maintain low levels of commitment and cooperation. Though the IWT called for cooperation in joint planning and development of the Indus Basin by India and Pakistan, no matter requiring joint planning has been proposed by either side thus far. The IWT has, therefore, been a ‘conflict resolution’ rather than a ‘basin management’ treaty.

We will now offer a few suggestions to ensure this iconic treaty that has stood the test of time, 3 wars and constant strife remains a model of India-Pakistan cooperation, more so at a time when water scarcity is a harsh reality and given the history of these warring nations, it could turn a historic treaty into the next victim of Water Wars.

In the specific case of Pakistan which depends on the Indus river basin for most of its water requirement, the World Bank’s Strategic Country Environment Assessment Report, 2007 mentioned that the per capita availability of water in Pakistan had declined from about 5000 cubic meters in 1951 to about 1100 in 2007, just above the internationally recognized scarcity rate. It further estimated that this would drop below 700 cubic meters per person by 2025.

Even if Indian dams on the Western rivers are destroyed, it would make no fundamental change to the availability of water in Pakistan for three reasons. One, the Indian infrastructure on these rivers is mostly run-of-the-water, with no additional storage after the initial filling is done. Two, India has still not fully utilized the amount of storage authorized to it by the treaty. Lastly, Pakistan is struggling with storage of even the present amount of water resources, with no new major dams since the Tarbela Dam, which is also under stress due to silting. Its storage capacity as decreased from an initial 9.6 million acres foot (MAF) to about 6.6 MAF due to lack of maintenance over the years. To rectify this problem now will need monetary and engineering resources that may exceed the current capability of the Pakistan economy.

Despite its generous hydro diplomacy, India has not been able to exploit its own water resources or earn some goodwill from its co-riparian neighbours. Similarly, Pakistan also faces acute domestic pressure over the inter province rivalry over the distribution of Indus waters. The idea of ‘Water Rationality’ proposes that countries act to safeguard their long term supply of fresh water. Towards this end, cooperation rather than conflict appears to be a more probable and beneficial option between the two co-riparian nations. Pakistan has been following the legalistic approach in dealing with the water sharing issues with India because of which it ends up blocking and delaying most of the Indian projects. As most of the Indian projects on the Western rivers are meant for development of the region of J&K, Pakistan’s approach should be based on ‘human security approach’. This would be mutually beneficial to both sides as India can ensure development of the state of J&K and Pakistan will benefit from the regulation of supplies which fluctuate between floods during monsoon to no supply during the dry months. Water needs to be treated as an apolitical resource. The IWT had to be negotiated for over 12 years due to the politicization of the technical and engineering issues related to the sharing of the waters. The World Bank was forced to modify its proposal of joint management of the Indus Basin to division of rivers between the two states. The current day objections being raised by Pakistan are more political in nature rather than being objective and related to the provisions of the IWT. It is in the interest of both the countries to strengthen the bilateral mechanism of the Permanent Indus Commission and resolve issues on a technical basis rather than getting into time consuming and seemingly never ending international arbitration.

Suggestions

 

Both Pakistan and India need water, but there is a colossal amount of wastage of ground water due to inefficient irrigation and on other accounts of mismanagement of water. While farming takes only 3 percent of water withdrawals in the UK and 41 percent in the USA, the percentage is as high as 90 percent in India and Pakistan. Water management can be improved by undertaking actions under the three basic categories i.e. increase supply, decrease demand and improve quality. No new water sources are likely to be developed in the near future. On the contrary, existing water supply is likely to be depleted in due course of time due to global warming and silting of rivers and dams. In order to improve the supply of water, focus has to shift on better water management practices, some of which include wastewater reclamation, water harvesting and desalination. This would also include improvement of the irrigation canal network in Pakistan Punjab, which has seriously degraded over the years due to neglect.

Demand can be decreased/ rationalized by improvement in irrigation techniques. Both India and Pakistan use flood irrigation technique which not only leads to large amount of wastage of water, but also causes degradation of the quality of soil due to salivation and silting. Alternative water efficient techniques like drip irrigation need to be developed. Public awareness for water conservation, rationing and management of urban and industrial demand should be inculcated and underground water should be avoided for irrigation purposes as the same will severely reduce the availability of drinking water in the medium to long term.

Lastly, emphasis should be put on improving the quality of water. At present, the entire debate and dispute over sharing of Indus waters is centered around the quantity of water with little concern on the need to maintain the quality of water in the basin. Quality of water can be improved by treatment of drinking water at appropriate levels and ensuring sanitation in and around river bodies. This would further help in controlling water borne diseases.

Conclusion

 

There is universal acknowledgement of the IWT being a model treaty that has stood even through three wars in the area in question. However, one possible reason for this could be that the upper riparian i.e. India, for a long time, lacked the economic means to exploit the resources allocated to it by the treaty. It was only after the economic liberalization in the 90s that India started to develop works and projects on the Western rivers to exploit the share of water legally allocated to it by the IWT, and it was only since then that major differences on the interpretation of the treaty arose between India and Pakistan. This narrative is yet to play out fully in the future as India moves towards realizing its full share of the waters of the Western rivers over the coming years.

The role of the World Bank as a third party was pivotal in creating the negotiating space required by the two countries. The World Bank also leveraged its financial muscle to remove the deadlocks created during the negotiations. The process of the two adversaries reaching an agreement over the sharing of the waters is also an act of water rationality and reinforces the belief that co-riparians must cooperate to achieve water security as conflicts and wars over water have no scope of improving the water availability and quality.

The IWT is also a unique treaty as it focused on equitable division rather than the sharing of the Indus Rivers. This very feature of the treaty is also a technical restriction in ensuring optimum utilization of the river basin. With a growing requirement of water on both sides and the dwindling supply in the rivers, the IWT, like some other treaties, has come under stress and is likely to remain so in future also. The treaty may be sub-optimal on the utilization and development of the Indus Basin, but it is the best the two countries could agree upon after long lasting negotiations spread over 12 years. India and Pakistan need to ensure that the water sharing issues are discussed and resolved at appropriate levels rather than being made a political and leveraging issue. The level of cooperation on water sharing issues between India and Pakistan is far below the ideal, but he same is not a restriction imposed by the provisions of the IWT, but by the complex political environment of rivalry and mistrust which has mired the Indo-Pak relations ever since Partition.

The IWT has stood the test of extreme provocations and three all out wars in the last 50 years, coupled with a long standing insurgency abetted by Pakistan. This, in itself, is sufficient to call it a successful treaty beyond all doubt.

Indus Water Treaty: Next Victim of Water Wars? Part – I

 

 

1962 : Army Exercises in 1960 Had Predicted Chinese Attack

SOURCE:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/army-exercises-in-1960-had-predicted-chinese-attack/story-UXurm5n8OKopthc4mwl8eO.html



     Army Exercises in 1960 Had Predicted
                       Chinese Attack
                            Based on

[ THE WAR THAT WAS NOT A WAR ]


   IT WAS HUMILATION OF A CIVILIZATION

                                     CALLED

                         INDIAN CIVILIZATION

MORONS AROUND RAISINA HILLS HAVE NOT LEARNT

A LESSON TILL DATE NOR WILL THEY EVER LEARN


The humiliating defeat the Indian Army suffered in 1962, is always back in the news after the Henderson Brooks report leak, could have been avoided had the political and military leadership paid attention to two military exercises that predicted the attack.

On March 17, 1960, Lt Gen SPP Thorat, commanding the Eastern Command, conducted a military exercise that accurately predicted the timing and nature of a possible Chinese attack. The Eastern Command would bear the brunt of the fighting as Chinese hordes moved into Arunachal Pradesh and came up to Tezpur in Assam.

A few months after Gen Thorat’s assessment, the Western Command carried out ‘Exercise Sheel’. Gen Thapar was the army commander and responsible for the Ladakh sector, which would also face a major assault from the Chinese in the Aksai Chin area of Jammu & Kashmir.

‘Exercise Sheel’, carried out in October 1960, made it clear that an extra army division was needed to repel a possible Chinese attack. Gen Thapar was promoted as army chief in May 1961. Inexplicably, he did not respond to Western Command’s demand for the extra division in September 1961.


Gen Thorat’s ‘Exercise Lal Qila’, conducted in Lucknow, was perhaps the most detailed military drill carried out. Its findings were accessed by military historian and author Kunal Verma, who met Gen Thorat’s family decades later. “I went through his personal diaries… he had precise knowledge about the nature and timing of the attack,” Verma told HT.

Gen Thorat made detailed studies of Intelligence Bureau reports, the terrain, the time taken by Chinese troops to cover distances and their preparations to accurately predict a Chinese attack.

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Gen Thorat set three aims for his exhaustive study. First, the forces under his command must prevent ingress into India and Sikkim, besides a simultaneous attack from East Pakistan. Second, he was preparing to give assistance to Nepal if it came under attack. Third, he wanted to maintain law and order in the northeastern states during such a war.

Interestingly, Gen Thorat noted that once war was declared, he had no option but to arrange with the Indian Air Force (IAF) to take on suitable targets near the border areas.

However, the IAF was never used and this contributed significantly to India’s defeat.


Gen Thorat’s 50-page report was finally seen by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru when the 1962 war was nearing its end. According to Verma, Gen Thorat was flown down to Delhi by a special plane because Nehru wanted his advice. In fact, Gen Thorat has recorded this meeting in his autobiography ‘From Reveille to Retreat’.


“From all accounts, the meeting was initially tense as Nehru read the report and was stunned when Gen Thorat said the Chinese would withdraw from the occupied territories. Gen Thorat, as a commander of the troops during the Korean war, had dealt with the Chinese and understood their capabilities,” Verma said.

Had Nehru seen the two detailed studies in 1960, the defeat at the hands of the Chinese could have been avoided.

                                  "NO"
THERE STILL WOULD HAVE BEEN 1962                               BECAUSE
          GEO-POLTICS DON'T FUNCTION
                                  ON
           NEHRUVIAN   EMOTIONS

Tags
• Indian Army
• Henderson Brooks report leak
• 1962 china war
• Indo-China war

The Future of India's Defense Exports

SOURCE:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-future-of-indias-defense-exports/

        The Future of India's Defense Exports

                                      By
                               Saurav Jha
 for The Diplomat

July 20, 2016

Can India reach its ambitious target of exporting $2 billion in defense technology per year?


Long among the world’s top importers of weapons, India now wants to turn its military related trade into a two-way affair by enhancing defense exports from its soil. This new emphasis on exporting military wares has yielded early results with Indian defense exports doubling over the course of the past year to about $330 million. India’s defense minister Manohar Parrikar, however, has set his sights higher and wants annual military exports to touch $2 billion in a couple of years. While the initial growth in sales has been driven by exports of military stores due to the removal of excessive controls, reaching Parrikar’s target would require Indian diplomacy to re-orient itself toward securing weapons contracts for major indigenously-developed systems under the aegis of the government’s “Strategy for Defense Exports” (SDE). SDE, which is overseen by the Department of Defense Production (DDP) in India’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) is intended to boost Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” scheme while consolidating Indian influence abroad.

 

In the initial phase, India’s defense sales effort is likely to concentrate on homegrown missile and naval systems, which have high indigenous content in terms of components. Of course, India will also progressively leverage the various international collaborations it has built up through years of co-production and co-development as it joins global export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). While India will try to export certain classes of tactical systems as widely as possible, weapons with greater strategic import will obviously be offered to select partners. Overall, India is likely to focus on a few key defense partners with which it has maximum strategic congruence for building up its position in the global defense market.

In keeping with that objective, Parrikar was accompanied by a large industry delegation comprising representatives from India’s main arms manufacturers during his visit to Vietnam in June. Military industrial ties were believed to be high on the agenda during Parrikar’s interaction with his Vietnamese counterpart, General Ngo Xuan Lich. On the sidelines of the visit, Parrikar stated that “India’s help in modernizing the Vietnamese military will not just strengthen the diplomatic and military bond between both the nations but also open the doors of strategic exports.”

 

Indeed, not only is India set to take a final decision on how it might transfer the BrahMos to Vietnam, it has begun discussions with Hanoi to sell the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) developed Varunastra 533 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Varunastra_(torpedo) ] millimeter heavyweight torpedo that was recently inducted into the Indian Navy (IN). Currently capable of being fired from a domestically developed ship based launcher, Varunastra is also being adapted for deployment from torpedo tubes sported by India’s submarine fleet, including the Russian-origin Kilo class units. So besides potentially equipping Vietnamese surface vessels, the Varunastra may also someday find its way onto Vietnam’s own Kilo class boats, especially given India’s involvement in training Vietnamese submariners.

As per India’s training and military cooperation agreements with Vietnam, it must also assist the latter in maintaining and upgrading equipment of Russian origin that is common to the militaries of both countries. Accordingly, Indian industry is looking to partner with Vietnamese firms to augment military platforms with weapons and sensors that Vietnam may not be able to affordably source from elsewhere. For example, India is reportedly set to upgrade two Soviet-era Petya-class frigates of the Vietnamese Navy with new sonar and torpedo launchers, a new fire control system, and a new antisubmarine rocket launcher system. Incidentally, Petya class boats can easily be equipped with 21 inch/533 mm torpedo launchers. And there is a strong possibility that initial Varunastra sales to Vietnam may form a part of this upgrade package. Other systems of Soviet origin in the Vietnamese military that have been identified for upgrades in collaboration with India include T-54/55 main battle tanks and BMP family infantry fighting vehicles, all which will receive new thermal sights and fire control systems. New Indian software defined radios are also likely to be purchased by Vietnam to upgrade both infantry and armored units.

Domestic modernization programs of both Russian as well as Western origin systems have given Indian industry a lot of experience in the arena of integrating equipment from diverse sources with different industry standards. This in turn has allowed Indian industry to emerge as a supplier of sensor and navigation upgrade packages for platforms of diverse origin besides being able to offer standard spares and maintenance services for the same. These capabilities are now getting reflected in the growth in exports that has taken place of late. For instance, last year India exported select avionics for Malaysia’s Su-30 MKM fighters, which are similar to India’s own Su-30 MKIs, and the two countries agreed to set up a “Su-30 forum” last November for exchanging information on training, maintenance, and technical support. With India beginning to train Vietnamese pilots for their own Su-30 MKV2s, one can expect similar exports to Vietnam too in the future.

Indian exports in the recent past have included light helicopters to Afghanistan, Nepal, and Namibia, DRDO developed HMS-X2 sonars to Myanmar (the same sonar likely to feature in Vietnam’s Petya class upgrade), and protective armor to NATO members like Turkey. A range of spares, mechanical components, and electronic assemblies are also being supplied to global majors as a result of offset agreements. A significant driver of this growth has been the simplification and streamlining of the DDP’s standard operating procedure for the issuance of no objection certificates (NOC) related to exports of military stores by domestic companies.

 

One other particularly noteworthy export has been that of the 1,300-ton offshore patrol vessel (OPV) MCGS Barracuda to Mauritius in December 2014. Built by DDP-controlled Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) for $50.8 million, the Barracuda is India’s first ever export of a home built warship. Besides the Barracuda, India’s government owned Goa Shipyard Limited is currently building two OPVs for the Sri Lankan Navy, as well as eleven fast attack craft (FAC) and two fast patrol vessels for Mauritius. India has supplied Sri Lanka and other Indian Ocean Region (IOR) countries with refurbished boats in the past, but is now looking to export new OPVs, interceptor craft, corvettes, and frigates to littoral states in the region. As per an Indian naval official, most countries in the IOR littoral seek “sub-20 meter boats for harbor patrol, 50-60 meter boats for their territorial waters, and 80-110 meter boats for their EEZ surveillance.”

 

East African countries such as Mozambique have certainly been looking toward India to help build their coastal fleets for a while and India may now finally be in a position to deliver. This is underlined by the fact that Indian defense shipyards have enhanced their capacity and productivity via recent modernization efforts and are now in a position to compete for foreign orders. GRSE has actually emerged as the lowest bidder for a two-frigate tender floated by the Philippines Navy (PN). However, even as defense shipyards have augmented themselves, some very modern private shipyards like Indian defense major L&T’s Kattupalli facility, which have been designed to build warships, are underutilized at the moment. As such, L&T is set to supply 10 fast interceptor craft of a type that it is already producing for the Indian Coast Guard to Vietnam for a contract worth about $90 million. This is being facilitated by the $100 million credit line extended to Vietnam by India for the purchase of critical defense equipment. During his visit to Vietnam, Parrikar reportedly assured the Indian private sector of the full support his ministry, DRDO, and public sector defense units to “realize the national aspiration of exports of defense items to friendly nations at competitive price.”

 

Spare capacity is certainly going to be a key consideration in arriving at a decision to actually export any indigenously-developed system. As Parrikar himself recently stated, “The government had taken a very conscious decision about 4-5 months ago that 10 percent of the missile capacity will be permitted to be exported if producers manage to get export orders subject to parameters set by the Union Government and External Affairs Ministry.” In that light, the Indian government’s desire to push for sales of the Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) system hold credibility, since annual production numbers for the missile is now in the high hundreds due to sizable orders from both the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Army. Potential customers for the Akash would include Vietnam, other ASEAN states, and a few customers in Africa. A smaller group from the same set of countries would also be offered the Pragati surface-to-surface missile with a range of 150 kilometers, the export version of the Prahaar, which resumed testing recently. The Pragati/Prahaar shares a common airframe and some avionics with India’s endo-atmospheric ballistic missile interceptor, Advanced Air Defense (AAD), creating possibilities for driving down costs through greater economies of scale. Another missile that is at the cusp of production and has been earmarked for export sales is the Astra beyond visual range air-to-air missile, which is compatible with the Su-27/30 family.

 

SDE notes that “the objective of (India’s) Defense Production Policy will not be achievable without having a well thought out export strategy, so that the industry is assured of access to export markets in addition to domestic market for investing in the sector.” However, in the initial years it will actually be capacity that will drive exports and not the other way around. Be that as it may, India seems cognizant that the successful export of military systems is contingent upon factors other than cost or project delivery. While it has chosen not to create a separate defense policy, it has moved to institutionalize the SDE under the rubric of the Ministry of Commerce’s (MoC) overall foreign trade policy thereby underlining the geoeconomic motivations behind India’s defense export drive.

 

A Defense Exports Steering Committee (DESC) headed by the secretary of DDP has been set up, with representatives from the Military, MoC, MEA, and occasionally even industry and academia for deliberating and taking decisions on the export of indigenously-developed “sensitive defense equipment” and to suggest specific steps that can boost exports. SDE calls for the use of “specific incentives and promotion schemes” to promote defense exports wherever possible. The need to provide soft financing for Indian defense exports to weaker countries has been clearly noted and MoC’s “Buyer’s Credit” facility is also expected to be leveraged. This assumes significance in light of the fact that Indian private companies face stiff competition from their Chinese counterparts in many emerging markets on account of the higher cost of capital in India.

 

Now even as India brings various stakeholders together in committee mode, the need to develop proficiency on defense industrial issues in India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) cannot be understated. SDE expects Indian embassies abroad to understand the requirements of their host countries and it is the MEA that actually controls the extension of line of credit to other countries. It also decides a “negative list” of countries to which most defense exports will be prohibited. Unfortunately, at the moment, the MEA is rather understaffed and needs to pay more attention to countries that are most likely to be markets for Indian defense exports. The MEA will also need to build a cadre of specialists focused on defense matters, something that is lacking at the moment.

 

India’s military, meanwhile, will have to up the ante on its own diplomatic initiatives. The Indian Navy (IN) has taken a lead in this arena and has been instrumental in securing warship exports in the IOR through the understanding it has built up with the countries in the region. Moreover, IN’s focus on indigenization has been central to creating the capacity for export as is evidenced above. Indeed, while Sri Lanka and Egypt may want to import the HAL Tejas, it remains to be seen whether that can happen anytime soon given current production capacity, which is based on modest IAF orders.

 In any case, weapons used by a domestic military usually find favor more easily abroad.

An early test for India’s diplomatic ability to secure military orders has, however, already presented itself. Though GRSE emerged as the lowest bidder and scored high on technical criteria during standard post-qualifications inspections by officials from Manila, its bid for the frigate supply tender valued at $437 million nevertheless stands disqualified at the moment on financial grounds. GRSE apparently does not fulfill the net financial contracting capacity criteria used by the Philippines Government to assess the financial capacity of a contractor to make good on delivery. This is due to the fact that Philippines will not make tranche payments for these frigates and GRSE’s current turnover is deemed as insufficient.
However, it must be said that GRSE currently has several ships on order from the Indian Navy including large stealth frigates and in any case has an implicit sovereign guarantee given that it is a defense shipyard. This point will need to be adequately conveyed through diplomatic channels and IN will have to do its bit to persuade its PN counterparts as well.

 

While incentives may be used to push Indian defense exports in several categories, there are certain weapons which are widely sought after chiefly on capability grounds by foreign nations. The BrahMos is of course a stand out example, with apparently 15 countries including Vietnam, Indonesia, UAE, Chile, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Algeria, Greece, Thailand, Egypt, Singapore, Venezuela, Brazil, and even Bulgaria reportedly expressing interest. However, systems such as the BrahMos, though MTCR compliant, will be sold on the basis of a balance of interests. Vietnam, with its key position in the South China Sea theater and its closeness to Russia, the United States, and Japan is an obvious choice, especially since some in India see it as “our Pakistan.” There have been reports that the UAE is also very keen for the BrahMos and that a decision is expected soon, but one should remain skeptical about this given India’s ambitions in Iran. India will likely be even more judicious about the air-launched BrahMos once that enters production since all ASEAN Su-27/30 operators may be eyeing it. But then, that is a story for another day.

Saurav Jha is a commentator on energy and security affairs. Follow him on Twitter @SJha1618.

















 

KASHMIR : NETAJEE U HAVE NO CHOICE - Stand by Our Soldiers OR Stand by the side of Cowards.

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/let-us-stand-by-our-soldiers-in-kashmir/269266.html



“I want to be clear: there is no justification for violence against law enforcement. None. These attacks are the work of cowards who speak for no one. They right no wrongs. They advance no causes”.

                             NETAJEE                        


           KYA HAAL KAR DIYA IS MULK KA

         


                  DEKH TERE JAWAN KI HALAT

               KIA HO GAI  BHAGWAN,

            KITNA BADAL GIA JARNAIL
                           [ READ AS ]

                                             DOOMED HE IS


            SHOOTS HE IS DOOMNED 
                                   &
    DOES NOT SHOOT HE IS DOOMED

JAWAN BEING KICKED BUT CANNOT               DEFEND HIMSELF THOUGH HOLDING AK47.


             HE HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN 
                                TO
                DEFEND HIMSELF.
      

Let Us Stand by Our Soldiers in Kashmir

                                    By

                   Capt Amarinder Singh

The situation in J&K is such that the Army is damned if it acts and damned if it does not. It needs the government’s backing. AFP


A few days ago, a picture was posted on Facebook showing a young CRPF jawan lying on the ground being kicked by gloating hooligans who believe they have the right to treat our security forces as such, and are the answer to Kashmir’s problems.

That was for me a case of “Enough is Enough”.

These hooligans seem to believe that India will succumb to their macho instincts. By now they should have realised that Kashmir is a part of India, as Maharaja Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of Accession on August 18, 1947, long before they were born. That was then the condition laid down for all Indian princely states, and that signature made Kashmir an integral part of India, notwithstanding the regular hiccups from Pakistan or from their sympathisers in the Valley.

Recently, a mobile patrol of 14 RR near Bandipura was attacked. Tomorrow it may be some other military establishment. The headquarters of 15 Corps at Srinagar was attacked in the past. The pattern is consistent, when military activity is curtailed or subdued, militancy rises.

History has on so many occasions shown us that unless the writ of the government is firmly established, negotiations are futile.

This phenomenon of the Valley turning out for a militant’s funeral will happen and will grow unless the government acts. The past is full of incidents which have strengthened militancy through appeasement. We today have Mehbooba Mufti as the Chief Minister, whose penchant for playing with fire is well established. We had militants being released in the past for her sister Rubaiya Sayeed; the first act of appeasement.  Her father, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, was then the Union Home Minister. We then had the Delhi-Kathmandu flight hijacked to Kandahar in 1999. Three prominent militants in custody were released, including Maulana Masood Azhar of the Jaish-e-Mohammad. This was followed by an attack on our Parliament in December 2001, with Azhar being the mastermind. Appeasement only leads to the strengthening of the militants’ morale, while demoralising that of one’s own forces

It was after the failure of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Operation Gibraltar in 1965, that the ISI escalated its involvement in Kashmir. When the holy relic of the Prophet was stolen in Srinagar in 1964 and riots broke out, all that was required to quell the riots were four Punjab Armed Police battalions.

Look at the force level today?

This is not the fault of the Army or the other security forces, but a confused Kashmir policy that has brought the current situation to the fore. The Army can contain a situation to a point, it is then for the Government of India (GoI) to take whatever political initiatives are required.

The trouble is that before the Army brings Kashmir to the point necessary for negotiations, dabbling commences and the first casualty is the Army itself.

Those who do not have any experience of counter-insurgency operations seem to comment the most and do untold harm to the system. These are not riots, as the PDP MP, Muzaffar Baig, would make us believe by quoting a Supreme Court ruling, but full-fledged insurgency. This procedure is not possible in a full-fledged battle and I believe, has not been the intention in the SC’s judgment.


The Army must be allowed to bring militancy under control to a point where those professing it realise that the time has come to talk. Yes, people will die in the ensuing action, then so be it. Kashmir is Indian territory.  If those owing allegiance to Pakistan’s ISI continue to create instability then they must face the music. The Burhan Wanis may be the glamour boys for many, to India they are the perpetrators of violence and separatism. Let them not live with a mistaken belief that they have the upper hand.


The Government of India must allow freedom of action to the Army. The directive must be just one: “Bring a situation in the state where the writ of India runs and not that of the ISI”. Yes, in the ensuing clashes collateral damage will take place.

No soldier likes such action.

,He is trained to face the enemy not protecting his back(ARSE) against treacherous elements.

We have had this experience in Nagaland, Manipur etc. The British army considered their Northern Ireland commitment prior to peace with the IRA, in the same light. It was the IRA which finally decided to talk peace when they could not face growing military pressure.

 
In such situations, the government must support any military action taken. Unfortunately, this has not been the situation. For instance, in Budgam when a car broke through a military checkpoint in November 2014, the soldiers manning the post opened fire, as was their duty.

 One officer and eight jawans were court-martialled and imprisoned.

Penalising soldiers for doing what was expected of them is unacceptable. It is for the Chief and his Northern Army Commander to stand by their men in the difficult duty they are performing and not succumb to political pressures.

A patrol was mobbed in the Qazigund area and an effort was made by the mob to snatch weapons from the soldiers, the patrol had to open fire to extricate itself, in which one man and two women were killed.

The Army says it “deeply regretted” the incident and an inquiry has been ordered.


This is ludicrous.

 Are we becoming an army of girl guides?

What would have happened to the patrol leader had they managed to snatch the weapons? It seems the current policy is that you are wrong if you do and you are also wrong if you don’t – an absurd situation.

In the late 1950s, my battalion was in Nagaland. The orders were that no Naga would be dressed in khaki and would carry a weapon. One day, in the early morning mist an NCO-led patrol came across a Naga in khaki with what looked like a weapon (it was a staff). When challenged, he panicked and ran and the patrol opened fire killing him. It so happened, his daughter worked in the PMO. In the rumpus that followed, the PM demanded the battalion be disbanded. The Army Chief, General Thimmaya, refused to comply. He stood by his battalion and his NCO. Here we are today still serving the country. This is what the Army expects from our Chief and our Army commanders.


It would be appropriate to end with a quote from President Obama’s statement on the recent violence against the police in Baton Rouge, Louisiana:

 “I want to be clear: there is no justification for violence against law enforcement. None. These attacks are the work of cowards who speak for no one. They right no wrongs. They advance no causes”.


This in full applies to Kashmir.