PLA : China Eyes 18 Overseas Naval Bases (R)

SOURCE:
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-eyes-18-overseas-naval-bases

GEOPOLITICS

China Eyes 18 Overseas Naval Bases

                                BY

               MONIKA CHANSORIA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gE1iI5cWsPw These developments are in sync with China’s much  pronounced Maritime Silk Route strategy.

With the recent challenging of the notion of the  Indian Ocean Region (IOR) being India's "strategic  backyard", China is gradually upping the ante in the  maritime realm around India — a traditional  strategic nerve centre for New Delhi. Beijing is  sending a tacit signal, wherein it "recognises India's  special role in stabilising the strategic Indian  Ocean Region, but the perception that it is India's  'backyard' may result in clashes..." The caution thrown in by China needs to be read in  conjunction with the cumulative maritime activity of  the PLA Navy (PLAN) and its mounting forays into  the Indian Ocean — the third largest water body in  the world. The expanding strategic naval footprint in  the Indian Ocean by means of acquiring more  maritime bases and berthing facilities is a core  pillar of China's ports Policy. The PLAN's presence  and deployment in the IOR have been on the rise  since 2014, when a Song-class conventional  submarine docked in the Colombo harbour along  with a Ming-class diesel-electric nuclear submarine.  Striking, was the fact, that the submarine docked at  Colombo's South Container Terminal that is built,  run, and controlled by China Merchants Holdings —  thereby raising queries as to why did it not choose to  dock at the Sri Lanka port Authority in Colombo,  which is mandated to accommodate foreign military  vessels? The emphasis to dock at a minuscule  "Chinese facility" well within a Sri Lankan  administered harbour, merits careful analysis. Given its strategic placement, Sri Lanka is fast  becoming the pivot of rising Chinese naval  presence in the IOR, in that, China also has a  substantial controlling stake in the Hambantota  port, withColombo agreeing to grant Chinese state- ownedcompanies operating rights to as many as  four berths in exchange for an easing of loan  conditions.Besides, there are unconfirmed reports  of construction of a Chinese-run aircraft  maintenance facility near Hambantota in order to  service PLAAF assets based in Sri Lanka. In  neighbouring Pakistan, the docking of a Chinese  submarine in Karachi, following the handing over of  the port's operational control to China Overseas port  Holdings is another step towards consolidating  Chinese permanent navalpresence in South Asia. These developments, significantly, are in sync with  China's much pronounced Maritime Silk Route  strategy — a prominent feature of the upcoming 13th  Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The maritime route is a  proposed sea network of ports, coastal  infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in  the Fujian province and culminating in the northern  Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of this fresh strategy,  Beijing seeks to gain greater access to the strategic  pathways of the Indian Ocean, alleviated access to  the Gulf oil — which consequently shall reduce its  dependence on the passage through the Straits of  Malacca — a key potential vulnerability for China in  the event of a future conflict. China recognises fully well that in order to boost its  naval power projection capability, it will have to gain  greater access to ports and berthing facilities. This  is being increasingly reflected with China's covert  strategy of granting huge loans to smaller coastal  island nations that are in dire need for  developmental funds to improve infrastructure. The  pattern that China is following, almost unvaryingly  for handing out these loans, is that there are "no  conditions and/or transparency measures" while  issuing the loan. As soon as the island nation in  question reaches the stage where it is unable to  repay the loan on time, China thereafter "offers" to  "waive off/relax" loan conditions in exchange for a  "few berths" for that particular naval facility. The  Maldivian project is a case in point, in which China  is developing the iHavan Integrated Development  Project in the northernmost main sea line of  communication joining Southeast Asia and China to  West Asia and Europe. The iHavan project is riding  on huge concessional loans/aid financing from  China and it is being forecast that Maldives shall  almost certainly default on payments, thereby  allowing China to seize a few berthing facilities  there. This pattern could well be adopted in the future with  many other countries, especially since official  Chinese publications including Xinhua have  advocated and "advised" the PLA Navy to build as  many as 18 overseas naval military bases in the  greater Indian Ocean area, possibly including:  Chongjin port (North Korea),  Moresby port (Papua New Guinea), Sihanoukville port (Cambodia), Koh Lanta port (Thailand),  Sittwe port (Myanmar),  Dhaka port (Bangladesh),  Gwadar port (Pakistan),  Hambantota port (Sri Lanka),  Maldives,  Seychelles,  Djibouti port (Djibouti),  Lagos port (Nigeria),  Mombasa port (Kenya),  Dar-es-Salaam port (Tanzania),  Luanda port (Angola) and the  Walvis Bay port (Namibia). The long shadow of China's ports policy in the Indian  Ocean being currently driven and characterised by  both, state- and private-sponsored "infrastructure  investment", foretells strategic ramifications  militarily as these facilities shall end up becoming  communication and surveillance facilities, in  addition to being repair and replenishment centres  for the Chinese Navy — underscoring the  intransigent course of Beijing's influence in South  Asia and the Indian Ocean.