Sunday, January 11, 2015

Royal Roulette : Who will be the next generation of Saudi leaders?

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/07/royal-roulette-saudi-arabia-secession/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Flashpoints&utm_campaign=2014_FlashPoints%20%5BManual%5D1%2F8RS



                            Royal Roulette 

            Who will be the next generation

                                      of

                             Saudi leaders?


  
Royal Roulette
 
 
 
The latest news from Saudi Arabia is that 90-year-old King Abdullah is, in the words of the crown prince, “recovering from [his] illness.” That could be about right: The king went into a hospital in Riyadh on Dec. 31 and it takes about a week for antibiotics — the standard way to treat pneumonia, his declared ailment — to take effect.
 
 
But this is hardly a time to relax. The kingdom is a key member of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, whose fighters are testing its defenses, as a Jan. 5 attack along the Saudi-Iraqi border, which killed three Saudi border guards, showed. Also, Saudi Arabia should be a key player in the collapsing oil market, but is currently a powerless one, unable to stop the plunging price of oil but consoling itself that U.S. shale producers, as well as Russia and Iran, are probably finding the process even more painful.
 
 
Even if Abdullah suffers no health setbacks, the king is probably going to be out of the picture for a few weeks, dealing with the aftereffects of pneumonia. That is a big enough challenge. Until now he has been the top decision-maker, playing a personal role in sorting out the diplomatic squabble with neighboring Qatar, holding a summit with Jordan’s King Abdullah, and replacing six ministers in a cabinet reshuffle last month.
 
 
 
Will Abdullah allow Crown Prince Salman to take over that role in his absence? Probably not.
There are questions about whether Salman, despite his frenetic schedule of meetings and public events, is capable.
There are questions about whether Salman, despite his frenetic schedule of meetings and public events, is capable. As former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel wrote almost two years ago, the crown prince “has been reported to be increasingly ill … and often not up to the job.” A BBC analysis also noted unconfirmed reports that Salman “suffers health problems.”
 
 

A key question is the extent to which Abdullah will have a role in the palace politics over his successor, which are gathering pace. The prevailing view of commentators writing about the kingdom has been that, this time around, succession to the Saudi throne should be “smooth.” The caveats are about the future — concerns about the time after next that the desert kingdom has to choose a leader, rather than about how it will choose Abdullah’s successor.
 
It’s high time that conventional wisdom came under greater scrutiny. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s coming transition is unlikely to be smooth — although this is certainly the way the House of Saud will want it to appear.
 
 
The kingdom’s leadership is arguably actually at a crossroads, with two royal factions vying for preeminence. The outcome could produce a whole range of new faces in positions of power in Riyadh. This could emerge as a problem for Washington, as experienced hands could be replaced with merely ambitious ones. In these circumstances, King Abdullah’s likely legacy of a slightly cranky approach to progress — allowing for some marginalization of the more obscurantist clerics but always retaining a foot on the proverbial brake — could become a distant memory.
 
 
To understand why the coming succession battle will be so thorny, it’s important to understand the succession system that has operated in Saudi Arabia since its founding. All the main characters — King Abdullah himself, as well as Crown Prince Salman and Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin — are sons of the kingdom’s founder, King Abdulaziz, also known as Ibn Saud. When he died in 1953, Ibn Saud left a system in which the throne passed from son to younger son, rather than from father to son. All but a few of the original 35 sons of Ibn Saud who were still alive in 1953 have since died. Of those remaining — other than Abdullah himself, Salman, and Muqrin — all have been passed over for the throne. At 69 years old, Muqrin, the son of a Yemeni slave girl, is the youngest surviving son.
In essence, the struggle pits the Sudairis, the largest single group of full brothers among Ibn Saud’s sons, against the rest. Originally seven strong, the Sudairis all were born to the same mother, who came from the Sudairi tribe — hence their moniker, “the Sudairi Seven.” The group included some of Ibn Saudi’s most ambitious sons, and has dominated the House of Saud since the 1960s. King Fahd (died 2005), Crown Prince Sultan (died 2011), and Crown Prince Nayef (died 2012) were Sudairis, and older brothers of Crown Prince Salman. The remaining brothers are former Vice Minister of Defense Prince Abdulrahman, black sheep Prince Turki, and former Vice Minister of Interior Prince Ahmed.
 
 
The rise to prominence of King Abdullah — who was younger than Fahd, whom he succeeded, but older than Sultan — was achieved despite the best efforts of the Sudairis to thwart him. But since becoming king in 2005, Abdullah has had to accept three Sudairis as his crown prince: Sultan, then Nayef, and now Salman. With no full brothers of his own, he made alliances with other non-Sudairi princes to cement his authority. And crucially, he was also commander of the Saudi Arabia National Guard, the kingdom’s largest fighting force.
 
 
 
From a Western perspective, the way forward is for Abdullah to abdicate, Salman to be sidelined (there is a mechanism to declare the king or crown prince medically unfit), and for Muqrin to become king. From a Saudi point of view, however, this wouldn’t work.



Within the royal family, there is tremendous respect for ancestry, history, and the orderly transfer of power.

 
Within the royal family, there is tremendous respect for ancestry, history, and the orderly transfer of power. Even though Salman might not be up to the job, it’s politically very hard to for Saudi royals to push him aside: The princes hate any suggestion of dissension, which would then be visible to the wider world. The House of Saud was enormously embarrassed in the 1960s when Ibn Saud’s successor, King Saud, had to be pushed aside for demonstrable incompetence. Mere fecklessness is easier to paper over.
 
 

So, given Abdullah’s incapacity, Salman’s continuing ambition (or what instead may be his sons’ lust for power), and Muqrin’s apparent reluctance to raise his own profile to project leadership potential, it is easy to understand that many Saudis seem to think that the accession of Salman is inevitable. This logic would suggest that — again, not wanting to rock the boat too much — Salman would anoint Muqrin as his own crown prince.
 
 
But that’s not necessarily how Salman’s accession to the throne would play out. As king, he would be entitled to appoint his own crown prince. Yes, Abdullah created the job description of “deputy crown prince” and put Muqrin in the role — but that doesn’t guarantee Muqrin would be promoted.
 
 
Abdullah’s attempt to secure Muqrin an advance oath of allegiance from other senior princes was not unanimous. Salman could reverse Abdullah’s plans once he becomes king, perhaps appointing his previously passed-over full brother, Ahmed, as crown prince. However, that concentration of power may be more than the non-Sudairi princes would tolerate.
 
 
This still leaves open the question of where the throne goes after Muqrin: Once all of Ibn Saud’s sons are dead or incapacitated, which grandson of Ibn Saud will inherit the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? And given Saudi Arabia’s central role in the current challenges of the Middle East, is it enough that the succession be smooth — or should Washington and other Western capitals encourage the House of Saud to allow the prince with the greatest experience and leadership qualities to emerge on top?
 
 
There is at least one argument that should trump the institutional conservatism in the palaces of Riyadh: Given the regional threats in the Middle East, making a muddled decision on a leader now could threaten the future of the royal house itself.
 
 
 
 
 

Sunday, January 4, 2015

ON O. R. O. P. : LET IT BE DISINFORMATION OR GOEBBELS PRINCIPLES. THE VICTORY OF TRUTH SHALL PREVAIL



















           ON   O. R. O. P :  LET IT BE     DISINFORMATION  OR GOEBBELS PRINCIPLES. THE VICTORY OF TRUTH   
                                    SHALL PREVAIL



 FOR SOME TIME NOW IT SEEMS SOME CONFUSING & MISLEADING NEWS IS APPEARING IN THE MEDIA, SOURCE & REASONS ARE NOT KNOWN, BUT ANY ONE WHO HAS READ MAHABHARTA WILL REACH TO CONCLUSSION THAT IT IS A CLASSICAL EXAMPLE OF  DISINFORMATION 


                                      OR

IS THERE SOME GOEBBEL IN ACTION!!!

             GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF             
                          PROPAGANDA  

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2013/09/goebbels-principles.html




QUOTE   

 " द्रोणाहाचार्य  'युधिष्ठर , अस्वथामा  कौन  मरा , हाथी  यह  नर ' " युधिष्टर   चूप  रहे 


   MEANWHILE LORD KRISNA TAKES THE ADVNTAGE OF THE DISTRACTION
                                    &
RELEASES THE FATAL ARROW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
                                  TO                       
                        IMMOBOLISE     

             GURU DRONACHARYA "

                            WATCH

UNQUOTE 

                                                                                                                      

 WE ARE THANKFUL TO AERIAL VIEW FOR EXPOSING ONE SUCH ITEM  ON 'OROP' BY VESTED INTEREST  FLOTING ABOUT IN THE MEDIA & SOCIAL MEDIA


AERIALVIEW HAS CLARIFIED THE ISSUE  IN VERY SIMPLE WORDS                                    
                                                           

PLEASE READ ON & FORM YOUR VIEWS






Courtesy Aerial View



                             http://sharad10525.blogspot.in/


Aerial View 
 
Being Informed is the Best Weapon.
 


Sunday, 4 January 2015


Was it 80% of OROP or 80% of Satisfaction?




Courtesy Maj S K Jain



Appended below are the exact words spoken by RM on OROP during his interview on Headlines Today, for ready reference. This is a mixture of English and Hindi words. Hindi words in blue for easy identification. Though Maj Jain has taken due care but still there may be some errors. This is part of reply which was given to a question asked by Col Thapar (from 22 minutes into the interview).


Except above, no other statement is available where RM has spoken about the percentage (80%) in relation to OROP. It appears that the words spoken on Headlines Today, are being used by different readers and commentators as per their personal understanding.

It appears he (RM) has talked about "if not 100% satisfaction then 80% or 90% satisfaction" and NOT 80% of OROP as has been stated by many.

"About OROP I think I have just understood exactly what it means. Now the second round which I have started is to identify exact financial implication.  Kai Bar elections mein assurances diye jaaten hain assurances ka detailing aur analysis nahin hota hai. To main uska analysis kar raha hoon

Mai itna aswasta kar sakta hoon mere side se to main full pressure daalne wala hoon or more or less what is acceptable to the armed forces. Why I am saying more or less because nothing is 100% but satisfaction 100% nahin hua to 80% ho sakta hai 90% ho sakta hai. Yahan tak laane ki meri koshish hai ki most of the issues are sorted out, agreed by everyone.

Thode main usme nahin jaaunga jyada details mein Kyonki maine last time economic times mein jo kaha uske upar bhi kai logon ne kuchh comments dal diye without understanding what I was meaning. We cannot express everything in short 20 minutes or 30 minutes interview. What I have in my mind I try to express it maximum but though I am quite articulate I probably was not able to put it in short way.

But I can assure you this much ye issue main jyada din khinch kar nahin jaunga. I will sort it out at the earliest and though I promise for major satisfaction. 100% satisfaction to everyone ye kabhi zindagi mein reality mein aati nahin hai. But jaise mai bola 80 % 90% tak agar satisfaction level le ke jaaun toh that will be good enough solution because from my side I will be always 100% but there are questions raised for various issues some minor corrections minor question marks may remain ultimately. But probably 4 to 8 weeks this should be resolved for once.

Coming out with the comprehensive solution so that next budget ke liye iske liye jaana nahin pade. Uske liye solution aa jaye next budget mein keval paise ke liye jaana pade."





( CONCERNED DIOLOUGE CAN BE VIEWED FROM  22 : 20 MINS ONWARDS )












 

Saturday, December 13, 2014

Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program












    Select Committee on Intelligence Report

              : Study of the CIA's Detention
                                     and
                   Interrogation Program

  - Foreword, Findings and Conclusions,

                                    and                    
                      Executive Summary




                                CLICK  THE   URL  BELOW

                                    TO

                       READ THE REPORT

http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-cia-detention-interrogation20141209.pdf|||Senate




FURTHER READING



Current Investigations

Collection System in the News


NSA Domestic Surveillance 








Reforms / Policy

Foreign Intelligence








Friday, December 12, 2014

Terra Incognita: Pakistan and Terror.







    Terra Incognita: Pakistan and Terror.

             "We know what we know . 

      We don't know what we don't know."







Man holds poster of Osama bin Laden at rally
Man holds poster of Osama bin Laden at rally in Pakistan 311. (photo credit:REUTERS/Naseer Ahmed)

 
In the film Zero Dark Thirty, one of the CIA men in Pakistan tells his station chief, in regard to the hunt for Osama bin-Laden,
“We don’t know what we don’t know.”
To which the chief replies,
 “what the f--- is that supposed to mean?”

 A good question. The above statement is a tautology, a self-reinforcing argument. However, in unraveling the support network for terrorism in Pakistan we are often presented with this narrative that it is

“unknowable.”


But as a recent report reveals, we know what we know:

Pakistan is a bankroller of terrorism, and has supported operations in India, including bombings in Mumbai and attacks in Kashmir, for years. It has also sought to colonize Afghanistan with Islamic extremism, the Taliban being its latest creature.



Yet, like a child who doesn’t learn from touching the hot stove, the West, and particularly America, has time and again forgotten what it knows. Some of this is willful blindness, motivated and necessitated by a Pakistani- created narrative that “we need them” as interlocutors with the Afghans. The border is porous, so the narrative goes. “We wouldn’t want something to happen,” the Pakistanis whisper, like a Mafioso telling a store owner that “sometimes fires happen.”


Let’s dispense with the parables. In a frontpage article in The International Herald Tribune, Carlotta Gall described her first-hand experience in Pakistan over the past decade trying to pinpoint how the Pakistanis gave aid and comfort to Osama bin-Laden. “In trying to prove that the ISI [Pakistani intelligence service] knew of Bin Laden’s whereabouts and protected him,” she writes, “I struggled for more than two years to piece together something other than circumstantial evidence and suppositions.” Gall put her life on the line investigating the dark secret of Pakistan’s dirty war. The truth came one winter evening in 2012. “I got the confirmation I was looking for,” she writes.


It turns out the ISI had a whole desk assigned

                                         to

 “handle” (read: “protect”) bin-Laden.


Gall pinpoints the correct conclusion: “Americans fail to understand and actively confront Pakistan on its support and export of terrorism,” but makes the wrong assertion about the import of the information, claiming this is



 “one reason [Afghan] President [Hamid] Karzai had  become disillusioned with the US.”


Forget Karzai. The “revelation” of Pakistani support for bin-Laden is not about Karzai, it is about the whole charade of US operations in Afghanistan.


             It reveals that America is,

 in essence, funding a war against itself.


On the one hand US soldiers man the lonely and ruggedly beautiful landscape of Afghanistan, and on the other hand, America works with the devil in Islamabad by supporting the Pakistan government financially. Pakistan in turn supports part of the Taliban, and the Taliban fights America.





We already knew this in the 1990s.

 We knew it in 2001 on 9/11.

                            And

we keep pretending that we don’t know it.

          The first time I became privy to this
           “secret” information was in 2000.



The vice-president of my fraternity was a Pakistani gentleman whose family were wealthy industrialists. Over a game of tennis one night he boasted,

“You know this war in Afghanistan, where this Northern Alliance is causing such trouble to the government”?


I didn’t.



“Well, the real story is that the ISI created the Taliban that runs the country and we are the main reason they won’t fall. This is a national security interest for us, we can’t have enemies on our border.”



Not long after, the Film LOC-Kargil came out.



It depicts how a Pakistani soldiers and their allied Islamist militia invaded India in 1999.



Overrunning a few Indian border units, it threatened to sweep down into the vale of Kashmir. The film depicts the heroism of the Indian army as units are dispatched piecemeal into battle against an unseen enemy.



“When I was a young man, sometimes a wolf would break into the village and we would shoot it. Something similar has happened here, wolves have broken into our house,” explains one commander to his men.


Except the Islamist militias in Kashmir, such as Laskar e-Taiba, were not wild animals; they were directed by the Pakistani ISI.



Like many intelligence services, the ISI views itself as above the state; it is the “sword around the throne.”

                                               And

 Pakistan is a failed state, so the ISI in fact runs a kind of parallel state to keep Pakistan from imploding


 The ISI state supports terror throughout Pakistan, against “internal enemies,” and throughout the region. It believes that if Afghanistan and India can be kept permanently unstable through financing Islamist insurgencies, then they will not be able to meddle in Pakistan’s crumbling internal affairs.



During the long war against the Soviets, the ISI actively recruited, trained, paid and encouraged specific commanders. In 1989 it was the main reason a peace agreement was not worked out when the Soviets left. In 1992 when Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani prime minister, tried to arrange a cease-fire in Afghanistan, according to Ahmed Rashid,


 “one section of the ISI helped Mr. Sharif broker his talks, another tried to stage a coup by smuggling hundreds of fighters loyal to the extremist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar into Kabul.”



The failure of the West is misunderstanding the nature of the ISI. It is more akin to the Revolutionary Guards in Iran than it is to the intelligence service of a “friendly” state. The problem is that the US became an unwitting ally of Pakistan in the 1970s. America conveniently ignored the radical Islamic government and its threat in the 1990s. Instead it coddled the ISI. For instance when they demanded that assistance to the mujahideen being funneled through Pakistan not be labeled as coming from America. So the Pakistanis passed off billions of aid as “from your Islamic brothers” as they sent it over to fight the Soviets.



In the 1990s the Arab Islamists who had drifted in from Saudi Arabia, and other places, such as China’s Xinjiang, Bosnia, Algeria, all passed through Pakistan. Murderers around the world received their training in Pakistan and the bases it funds across the border in Afghanistan. Mohammed Merah, the killer of French Jews in Toulouse, traveled to Pakistan in 2011. The London bombers traveled to Pakistan in 2003, the Times Square Bomber, and many others, were all connected to a Pakistan network. The Mumbai attackers were in regular phone contact with their Pakistani handlers in 2008 throughout their murder spree.


Ahmed Rashid, the Pakistani author, has argued for years that America is naïve in its dealings with Pakistan. He revealed in his 2008 book Descent into Chaos that in 2001

the US even allowed ISI agents working with the Taliban a window to escape Afghanistan through a Pakistani operation called the Kunduz airlift.


The ISI, which helped direct Taliban operations, which worked with bin-Laden, was allowed to safely exit the country.



Those that evacuated were partially responsible for 9/11, and the US gave them a carte blanche.





Rashid argues that after the US invasion

 the ISI set up a parallel department to back the Taliban, while at the same time pretending to work with the Americans.

 He writes

 “The ISI sent memos to [Pakistan president Pervez] Musharraf stating that the Americans would not stay long in Afghanistan and that the Taliban should be kept alive.”



Meanwhile the US gave almost $12 billion in aid to Pakistan, of which 80 percent went to the military. Some was funneled back into the Taliban. Only after the departure of US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Rashid argues, did the US begin listening to its commanders, who were sure that ISI was behind the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. Rashid claimed in 2010 that

“The key to more formal negotiations with Taliban leaders lies with Pakistan and the ISI.”



Consider another source, Abdul Salam Zaeef, Taliban ambassador to Pakistan in 2001.



He wrote a book in 2010, My Life with the Taliban, in which he relates that
 “since the start of the Jihad [against the Soviets] the ISI extended its roots deep into Afghanistan like a cancer puts down roots in the human body.”

                       He compares the ISI

               to a wolf invading Afghanistan.



Why hasn’t Pakistan been declared an international pariah?

Why has it not been sanctioned?


Aid withdrawn and its ISI declared a terrorist organization like Iran’s Revolutionary Guard?


Because the Pakistanis argue any reduction in aid might make them more


                         “radical.”



But how can a terrorist state become more radical? Will it support more international terrorism than it already does? Will it have more terrorist training bases than it already does? Some Pakistanis have woken up. In a letter to the International Herald Tribune, Hasan I. from Lahore writes; “I must say that the American government is responsible for wasting trillions of dollars in the wrong war and in the wrong place. So, if the ISI is the root cause of all evil (read terrorism) then, America should’ve gone after Pakistan, not give its army billions of dollars... maybe now if the Americans really wanted to make things better, they’d try to funnel the aid through civilian governments.”