Wednesday, January 4, 2017

Geo-Strategic Imperatives For India – OpEd

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/14102016-geo-strategic-imperatives-for-india-oped/#at_pco=smlwn-1.0&at_si=586cf9239b997967&at_ab=per-2&at_pos=0&at_tot=1




Geo-Strategic Imperatives For India – OpEd

                             BY

                 

                                 AND 

     


 


The term ‘Known Unknowns’, hitherto fore unheard of in India, and definitely not in the Indian strategic context, is a clarion call for Indian strategists to wake up to the reality of a post modern scenario where the severity of multifarious situations poses new and inexplicable dangers to the very sovereignty of the nation; if unheeded, it threatens to annihilate the very concept of united India as we know it. 

An initial look did surprise us of the extent to which the Indian establishment chose to ignore or conveniently overlook such very real possibilities. We try and put down some thoughts garnered from perspective; the factual information has been gleaned from very public sources of information and nothing written in succeeding paragraphs purports to be classified at all. In fact such is the free flow of information in contemporary times that it is shocking at times how “frog-in-the-well” our entire attitude has been; though equally encouraging is the role being played by an ever increasingly aware media and the growth of strong, democratic and independent thought which has an increasing influence on public thought and policy & decision making.
Another imperative for prompting such thought is that the world today is no longer a place where entire countries can choose to exist in seeming isolation. Severally connected and hinged economies often give rise to the term ‘shrinking world’, and not without reason. Such has the interdependence of trade and commerce become that it is no longer possible to survive singly. The other facet to this rule is the fact that policies, not only foreign but domestic as well, need to be shaped and re-shaped with each shift in the global tide. Often clarity of thought and purpose is lost in the intertwining of so many factors contributing towards fashioning the strategic and national aims of a country; this especially true when the focus is on new concepts and fresh ideas. As in the post-crisis business world, innovation seems to be the key word.

Concept of Known Unknowns and relevance in the Indian context

The concept of Known Unknowns has been studied and written about by Nathan Freier for the US Army War College. It is essentially unconventional strategic shocks in defence. Such shocks that by their sheer strategic impact, surprise and the potential for disruption and violence, they would demand the focused attention of defence leadership, as well as the decisive employment of defence capabilities in response. The US found 9/11 and the events after that catastrophe challenging for its defence establishment, but according to Lt Col Freier, a strategically dislocating surprise would be next, and just around the corner. And sure enough, we have a global war against the Islamic State, which is now threatening to turn into a new cold war between the US and Russia owing its dimensional shift in Syria. What with so many imponderables as Iran, North Korea, and even its failure in Afghanistan and its inability to deal with the Taliban in frontier districts of Pakistan, could the ‘strategically dislocating surprise’ come from this part of Asia? Could the stand off between India and Pakistan, both nuclear states be the catalyst to reorient strategy, investment and missions in so far as the US is concerned? Given that unconventional challenges lie definitely outside the realm of traditional war fighting, does not necessarily mean that it is non-violent, non-state, or unorganized.
Risks to national security which may not be fully anticipated or predicted would thus constitute Known Unknowns; that they exist can be conceived but yet they are not being imagined or expected. Defence strategy usually faces the critical flaws of being reactive in nature and lacking imagination. This is attributed to the otherwise strict hierarchical controls owing to the nature of the job; it however leaves strategy planning and decisions susceptible and vulnerable to surprise. Aversion to institutional change is another key factor. Yet the Known Unknowns stretch conventional wisdom to such an extent that it becomes difficult to ferret out a likely and suitable response, whereas their broad and fundamental implications rise and mature fast leaving little room for the system to adjust itself to the strategic and inherent changes. Concepts face the challenge of change and existing paradigms are questioned; prevailing strategy and assumptions are undermined leaving strategists little choice but to venture into uncharted territory.
What does this concept mean for India? The relevance of such disruptive and strategic shocks would find its roots in the very nature of India’s sub continental environment and the rapidly changing global economic scenario, which forces India to look into newer and unexpected areas of likely conflict. Given the history of animosity that engulfs the country historically, it becomes that much more a lucrative target for various sections of neighbouring establishments. Also with the rapid economic growth of modern India and its increasing clout in global affairs, it needs to forge new and meaningful relationships to further strengthen and consolidate its own position on the world stage. In drawing a parallel to the US, India has had its share of challenges like 26/11 and every new day announces new stories of insurgent and naxalite violence. China and Pakistan continue to be painful thorns in the side, and with both neighbours taking a hostile stand, the security establishment has its work cut out for it. Central Asia has always been strategically important and in the last three decades has faced intense turmoil with it being the new arena for wars, conflicts, socio-political changes and mushrooming religious fundamentalists. Its proximity to India and the vulnerability associated with it, should give a new focus to our policies, both domestic and foreign. New avenues for meaningful dialogue need to be explored and all available means of ensuring territorial integrity and the security of Indian citizens will have to be undertaken. Above all, conceptual framework should be reinforced with a strong military establishment, and a proactive doctrine. Indian strategists will do well to always be on their toes, since most state and non state antagonists are unlikely to change or just disappear; instead they may find new and innovative means to bleed the Indian behemoth.

Points to ponder for the Indian political and defence establishments

What is India’s geo-strategy?
What are its regional and global objectives? 
Is there focus on forming a coherent long term strategy or are we just blundering our way about international diplomacy? 
All these questions and more need to be answered by the Indian polity and thereafter the defence hierarchy. 
Endemic to the Indian system where the military functions as an arm of and under a civilian government, is the greater role played by the polity and the bureaucracy, in formulating policies. The defence establishment which implements these policies also needs to be given greater autonomy as also an implicit faith imposed in their ability to function apolitically, yet at the same instance provide valuable inputs to further governmental policies. Such a move has historically has been viewed with apprehension by the civilian establishment (and indeed, the sub-continent is rife with enough examples, both Pakistan and Bangladesh being cases in point). However this would also pave the way for flexibility and innovation in the functioning of the defence forces and thereby reduce the chances of getting shocked strategically!
In the regional context of the sub-continent, we continue to face relentless attack by subversive forces under various garbs. Does the fact that a country which is not only one eighth of the Indian landmass, but has been carved out of it, continues to implement strategy with impunity with the sole aim of bleeding India, tell us something? 
Are we indeed unable to deal with this imbalance for almost 70 years? 
Where dialogue and diplomacy may not work due to the inherent nature of the Pakistani mindset (it has always found itself threatened by India), can we switch tracks and look at such an infusion of economics, that it will becomes impossible for Pakistan to ignore the impact and therefore be forced to change its policies, or at least reign in those non state players who work towards subversion in Indian territory?
Where China has had the liberty of implementing various policies to bring it to the point of being an economic giant, India has been progressing too, albeit ponderously. On the one hand is the vibrancy of the Indian democracy and on the other is the lack of political will to implement measures for growth. These have in fact worked to further China’s subversive strategies, giving it a perfect platform to fuel naxalism inside Indian territory. Indeed, the growth story in India sometimes seems to be despite the government, not because of it! With its economic status well cemented, China also harbours ambitions of being a global power militarily. To that end, it has made rapid strides in bringing in technology and upgrading the fighting capabilities of its forces. It postures more frequently in a threatening manner, based on its historic border disputes with India. The recent spate of military/ naval posturing in the Indian Ocean region, the South China Sea, and the upcoming China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or the new Silk Route, are all signs of muscles being flexed by the Chinese dragon. However there seems to be little or no response and definitely a complete lack of coherent and well thought out strategy on our part. 
This is further taken as a sign of weakness and exploited increasingly. Alarming reports suggest that China has managed to slowly extend its hold over disputed border territory. Its increasing military clout is evident from its growing presence in the Indian Ocean which is essential to China’s projection of its power, but also a potential threat to Indian interests. What are we doing about these issues? At the end of the day, we do not have any cogent long term strategy in place and only now and very slowly waking up and gearing ourselves for a potential conflict with China. In its quest for energy and petroleum globally, China seems to succeed much more than does India. The infusion of Chinese funds into African economies and the number of successful bids in Central Asia and Africa for oilfields, is surely putting China in a more secure position by the day. Even the conduct of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 was meant to announce its arrival on the global stage. Surely these issues need to be examined.

Traditionally India held its non aligned status (but with a dash of convenience thrown in) through the Cold War years. With the break up of the USSR and the US emerging as the single and uncontested global hegemon, India found itself drawn into a closer relationship with the US. On its part the US also cannot ignore the rapid growth of Indian economy and has shown all signs of positive engagement with us. Yet, as they say in diplomat-speak, ‘There are no permanent friends, only permanent interests’. Contradictory to its engagement with India, the US continues to indirectly fuel conflict in the sub-continent through its policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To be fair to the US, it is unable to deal with its own creation (yet again!) and therefore cannot afford the collapse of the Pakistani establishment (and the nuclear dimension to boot!) and the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It then becomes incumbent on India to initiate positive relations by whatever means possible. Ultimately, Indian interests must be supreme for India and going by the analogy of permanent interests, it too should re-examine all avenues for its growth, security and consolidation of status. Post the economic meltdown in 2008 the US found itself more and more dependent on economies with strong growth. And what better candidate than a democracy (surrounded by all other forms of governance) with tremendous prospects in the foreseeable future. The question therefore is where are we headed in our relations with the US? Can all these positives not be leveraged to bring about a change in our regional equations? Policies may not change overnight, but concerted efforts would at least pave the way for a brighter future.
Indian capabilities both overt and covert face the prospect of erosion due to the lack of coherent long term strategies and egoist polity and bureaucracy, which resists the very idea of fresh infusion in thought processes. A paradigm shift in our outlook based on where our national interests lie is essential to the continued economic success and to obviate any possibility of attacks on our security and territorial integrity. It is therefore of paramount importance that a proactive and consistently innovative approach be adopted to geo-strategic concerns. Such a move would invariably herald the renaissance of India.
*Amitabh Hoskote, PHD (Development & Conflict Studies) & Vishakha Amitabh Hoskote, MA, MPHIL (International Relations, Political Science & Development Communication)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR


Amitabh Hoskote
Amitabh Hoskote
Amitabh Hoskote is a Strategic and Defense Professional and Scholar with varied experience in Combat, Defense Management, research in Security & Defense oriented issues, crises management, strategy planning & execution. With a Masters and PHD in Development and Conflict Studies, Finance and Economics, he has been an Honorary Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a leading Strategy Think Tank in India and writes regularly for the Eurasia Review on issues of geopolitical importance.

Sunday, January 1, 2017

STRATEGY - Strategic Perspectives: Clausewitz, Sun-tzu And Thucydides – Analysis

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/02072012-strategic-perspectives-clausewitz-sun-tzu-and-thucydides-analysis/#at_pco=smlwn-1.0&at_si=5868e061fac37928&at_ab=per-2&at_pos=0&at_tot=1



 Strategic Perspectives:

 Clausewitz, Sun-tzu And               Thucydides – Analysis

                        BY 

                 


 j

Strategy should be thought of, metaphorically, as the bridge connecting military power with political purpose. It is best defined as the use that is made of force and the threat of force to achieve policy ends. i  This definition privileges military strategy, which is the focus of this article. However, the importance of the “grand strategy” should also recognize what Americans call national security strategy. The latter can be defined as the coordinated use of all the assets available to a polity or other security community to achieve policy outcomes. ii
Whether one’s focus is narrowly military or is much broader, the distinguishing quality of strategy is its instrumentality. Strategy is not military power per se, nor is it the actual application of that power. Similarly, strategy is not policy. These may seem to be statements of the blindingly obvious, but misunderstanding of the nature and function of strategy is, and has always been, widespread. iii  This intellectual failure can have dire practical consequences. After all, we are talking about nothing less than war, peace, and even survival. A belligerent that “does not really do strategy,” for example, Germany in the two world wars, will, that is certain, pay a horrendous price for this lack.
Strategy matters. Indeed, historically viewed, given the sad centrality of war to the course of world events, there are few ideas and behaviors that matter more than strategy.

What Strategy Does

Strategy provides a theory of success. It is the source of operational plans intended to convert nominal military capability into useful performance against the enemy. As theory and as plan strategy explains how victory, or at least advantage, will be achieved. Such is its function and purpose. The metaphor of the ‘strategy bridge’ already introduced is especially apt, because it suggests both the possible fragility of the connection between military power and policy and the importance of two-way traffic between the two “banks.”
In essence, strategy performs a conversion function. It converts an army into a tool of statecraft directed to achieve desired political results. Little reflection is required to recognize the difficulty of this task. The strategist must convert one currency into another; military power into political benefit. This is simple to explain, but hideously challenging to do successfully and concretely. The task is relatively easy if the political object of a war is the total defeat of the enemy. In that rare case, the annihilation of the foe’s ability or will to resist is the object of both political and military activity. But even in such an elementary case, the strategist should be concerned to win the war in such a way that the postwar political context is not fatally compromised. More often than not, however, the dominant political goal in a war falls far short of achieving a total victory. The strategist seeks to use military power merely only in order to convince the enemy that he needs to make peace, lest worst consequences befall him. In that much more common situation, strategy becomes a matter of ever-debatable judgment.

 How much damage, and of what kind, will be necessary to reshape the political will of the adversary? Rephrased: at what point of military and other disadvantage will he cry quit?
To illustrate the nature and function of strategy, consider the behavior of Winston Churchill’s British government in the summer of 1940. With its army (the BEF: British Expeditionary Force) bundled off the continent in late May and very early June (evacuation from Dunkirk, May 26-June 4), and its French ally suing for a humiliating armistice on June 22, Britain’s previous plans were rendered invalid. In short, its former strategy had been destroyed by events. The enemy intervened, as Germany had a malign habit of doing.

Even fine strategic minds can be guilty of forgetting temporarily the all important truth that ........
“[w]ar is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”   iv 
Britain and France had agreed on a strategy of choking Nazi Germany to death in a long conflict in which the large resources advantage of the allies would prove decisive, as they had in 1918. Unfortunately, Germany declined to let itself be out-resourced in a long war, and instead defeated France in a short war that lasted only six weeks.

Britain could have sued for peace in July 1940. Indeed, that appeared to be the rational next step, since London could devise no plausible theory for how it would achieve victory, and therefore no credible strategy to bring about such a happy outcome. So, what was the British strategy in the truly desperate context of mid-1940? Churchill, with huge popular backing, insisted upon continuing the war. 

His strategy consisted of the following elements:

(1) deny Germany the option of conducting a successful invasion (meaning that the Royal Air Force [RAF] must remain competitive, and the Royal Navy [RN] must stay dominant in home water);

 (2) remain militarily active, though not necessarily effective, both for the sake of domestic and imperial morale, and – above all else – to tell the Americans that Britain was still fighting; and 

(3) be patient and wait for something decisively advantageous to turn up.
To be specific, British strategy in 1940–41  amounted to a determination to remain undefeated pending the anticipated entry of the United States into the war. That long predicted event was nowhere in sight in 1940, or through much of 1941, but Churchill needed his public and his political colleagues to believe that it was a certainty, sooner rather than later.
One might add a fourth element to these three items in British strategy. Churchill nursed the hope – perhaps the conviction – that simply by holding out, against severe odds, Britain would give Adolf Hitler time to make a fatal error or two. In point of fact, the Fuhrer made two such errors: he invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and quite gratuitously declared war on the United States on December 11 of that same year.
In the historical example just provided, Britain employed its overmatched (except for the RN, and the RAF over England) military forces with great strategic skill. Ineffective bombing raids were conducted – ineffective, that is, militarily. But RAF Bomber Command, although a paltry tool militarily, was used as a strategic instrument which carried a political message. Similarly, Churchill, ever the romantic warrior, demanded that the British armed forces carry the fight to the enemy in any way that they could. In addition to the bombing campaign, commando raids on the very long German-held coast of Europe were sanctioned.
Also, an organization designed to foster and support insurgency against German occupations on the continent (the Special Operations Executive, or SOE) was created. And, of course, the British could cheer themselves up and secure favorable headlines around the world by beating the Italians in the desert in North Africa and by conducting various and successful daring operations. Moreover, it was most kind and obliging of Mussolini to provide Britain with an enemy it could defeat in 1940.
The point of this article is to illustrate in a historically concrete manner the nature and function of strategy. In World War II Britain turned in a decidedly superior strategic performance. Despite the military disasters of 1940 and 1941, Britain functioned strategically to great political outcome. Britain’s strategic performance contrasted in the sharpest way with that of Germany. To cite a point made earlier, Germany did not really “do strategy.”  v

When the Schlieffen-Moltke Plan of 1914 for victory over France in six weeks failed, Germany had no “Plan B”: it had no strategy worthy of the name. The Great German General Staff carried out operations, not strategy. vi  The German conception of waging war rested on the overconfident assumption that by the execution of a brilliant operational concept the enemy would cave in and be defeated in a short war. When that concept proved faulty, as in 1914, the Germans were strategically baffled and at a loss of what to do. As if 1914–18 did not provide lessons hard enough, Germany made the same mistake of neglecting its strategy in the return to the battlefield of World War II. When Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR, failed to deliver victory in three months, as had been expected, again the Germans were strategically bewildered and confounded.  vii
Prussian-Germany, the country that provided us with “the only truly great book on war” and strategy that has ever been written, as American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie wrote of Carl von Clausewitz’s classic, viii  On War, demonstrated twice in thirty-one years exactly why strategy is important. The most admired Prussian-German soldier of the late nineteenth century, Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke, the victor of the wars against Austria in 1866 and France in 1867–71, praised Clausewitz even as he resolutely misunderstood him. Moltke, the true father of the mature General Staff system, set the German Army firmly on the path of tactical and operational excellence, although at the expense of strategy. In his own revealing words:
“In fact, strategy affords tactics the means for fighting and the probability of winning by the direction of armies and their meeting at the place of combat. On the other hand, strategy appropriates the success of every engagement and builds upon it: The demands of strategy grow silent in the face of tactical victory and adapt themselves to the newly created situation. Strategy is a system of expedients.”  ix


Whereas the Germans were plainly guilty of ignoring strategy in the two world wars, Americans have been known to adopt the wrong strategy. One must hasten to add that faulty strategic choice is not, of course, a uniquely American malady. Vietnam offers a clear historical example of what happens when a powerful commanding general (William C. Westmoreland), functioning according to the dictates of his organizational culture, persists in pursuing a strategy that does not work. One need hardly comment that it is important not only to have a strategy, which is to say to function strategically, but also to have a strategy that is sound  or,  at least, is sound enough.

Strategy is generally deemed a good thing, even if its nature and purpose are not well understood. In Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 America did not lack a strategy. General Westmoreland, no doubt an excellent general for the conduct of conventional warfare against a regular enemy, was devoted unshakably to a strategy of a war of military attrition. He had two broad options to choose from: He could either employ U.S. forces to try to seek out and destroy the Vietcong or adopt a form of enclave strategy designed to protect the bulk of the population.
He chose the former, despite a substantial body of expert advice as well as actual contemporary experience which recommended direct engagement. The result was that the people of South Vietnam were typically left perilously under protected while the American army engaged in largely futile sweeps, search and destroy missions of the more remote regions and jungles of the country for an evasive enemy. x
So it is essential to have a strategy but scarcely less important to have one which can succeed. By its very nature strategy is a practical activity. The most distinguished American strategist of the twentieth century, Bernard Brodie, is unambiguous in his characterization of his profession:
“Strategic thinking, or “theory” if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a “how to do it” study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? More important, will it be likely to work under the special circumstances under which it will next be tested? …Above all, strategic theory is a theory for action.” xi

Given the importance of strategy, the vital character of its role and the often truly awful consequences of erroneous strategic choice, what help is available to us from the great thinkers of the past?

Assistance from the Classics


                                    Carl von Clausewitz

Books on military topics are perennially popular, as also are works on the wisdom or otherwise of the use of force today. But books on the general theory of strategy, studies that have meaning for all places, purposes, technologies and times, are exceedingly rare. In point of fact, the past 2,400 years has yielded only three classic works on this subject and, arguably, no more than five others of enduring value. That is not a rich haul of profound collected reflection from the sad abundance of collective strategic history.xii
The three classic works on strategic theory differ about as much as can be in all aspects of their provenance. Where they agree, by and large, are in the ideas that they present. The books in question are:
  • Carl von Clausewitz, On War (written in the 1820s, published unfinished in 1832 after the author’s death in 1831).
  • Sun-tzu, The Art of War (written ca. 400 BC in China in the period of “Warring States, 403–221 BC”).    xiii
  • Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (written ca. 400 BC by a somewhat disgraced Athenian general: the History stops at 411, rather than proceeding to the final defeat of Athens in 406).  xiv
In addition to these three masterpieces, five other works merit honorable mention:
  • Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (1838).   xv
  • Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (1967, this is the [revised] fourth edition of the work).
  • Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (1987, 2001).  xvi
  • J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (1967, 1989).  xvii
  • Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War (1520).  xviii
All eight books deserve the ascription of classic to differing extents, though obviously a question mark must hang over the twentieth-century works by Liddell Hart, Luttwak and Wylie. To be a candidate for classic status a work has to stand the test of time. There is no rule advising us just how much time is required, but plainly the concept of the instant classic, so beloved by journalists and some publishers, has to be an oxymoron. All studies of strategy and war cannot help but bear the stamp of their historical context of authorship. And nearly all of them are fatally flawed as a consequence, at least with respect to their likelihood of being regarded by future generations as anything more than interesting period pieces.
The bad news, therefore, is that the trees that have been cut to produce books on allegedly strategic topics over the centuries has bequeathed to us less than two handfuls of truly outstanding general works of strategic theory. 
The good news, however, is that among the eight books that were retained three unarguably are of the highest quality. It is no exaggeration to claim that On War by Clausewitz, Sun-tzu’s Art of War and Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War are works of genius. But even in such elevated company, Clausewitz is outstanding.
It would be difficult to overstate the understanding, insight and educational value of Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and Thucydides. An army general could make for himself this maxim: If Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and Thucydides did not say it, it probably isn’t worth saying. Despite the poverty of most efforts at developing a general theory for strategy, the Clausewitz, Sun-tzu and Thucydides classics enjoy a secure intellectual dominance rarely achieved by any book or cluster of books in any field of scholarship.
These three authors, writing so far apart historically, and theorizing in radically different ways, have not only set a standard of excellence that is near impossible to emulate, but have, literally, done the job that needed doing. Thanks to their efforts, hugely divergent though they are in form, we have at hand an adequate theory of strategy nested in a general theory of statecraft.
The beginning of a sound strategic education is familiarity with, and understanding of, the arguments in all three books. As noted already, they are very different. Clausewitz’s On War is a philosophical tract which provides a theory of the nature, actually the natures, of war and strategy. To understand war, there is no better guide than the Prussian.
The heart of Clausewitz’s theory is the “trinity” of 
1) popular passion; 
2) fortune, opportunity, and risk; 
3) reason.
 These constituent elements are generally associated most closely with, respectively, the people, the army and its commander, and policy.xix Clausewitz also insists that war is a duel, a realm of uncertainty, and that friction intrudes at every step to hinder the smooth execution of cunning plans. He emphasizes the moral over the material factors in war, albeit without discounting the latter.
Above all else Clausewitz demands that force must be used only as a political instrument. That point may seem obvious to the point of banality but in practice, in war after war, armies have fought with scant real direction by policy. When engaged in warfare it can be difficult to remember that the purpose of the bloody enterprise is not just to win, as in a game, but to secure a desired political outcome. Consequently, the manner in which one fights is certain to have political consequences.

In contrast to the philosophical character of, and meticulous detail in, On War, Sun tzu’s Art of War is terse almost to a fault and, necessarily as a consequence, highly abstract. But notwithstanding its extreme brevity, the Art of War bears much the same educational message as does Clausewitz’s On War.  xx   There are some important differences of opinion between the two. Sun-tzu favors deception, emphasizes the role of surprise, intelligence, and spies, and does not draw attention to the role of friction and all the reasons why well wrought plans can unravel; at least he does not do so explicitly. However, he does insist upon the critical significance of understanding both the enemy and oneself.  xxi
It is interesting to note that Sun-tzu’s emphasis on the necessity of understanding the enemy has recently been rediscovered by the U.S. defense community. Diversity in culture is now recognized in Washington as an important factor which has consequences for both deterrence efforts and war.
The third of the masterworks, Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, is probably the most difficult to glean for strategic understanding. Whereas Sun-tzu’s Art of War is written as a brief to the emperor – it would make a perfect, if lengthy, PowerPoint presentation – and Clausewitz is explicitly theoretical from the very first page, Thucydides wrote a history book. The Greek soldier-historian deliberately tied his general wisdom to a historical narrative. The Peloponnesian War is not a work of abstraction or philosophy. This means that to understand war, peace, and strategy from Thucydides’ writing one has to comprehend the historical context. The result is immensely satisfying, but it must frustrate a busy soldier or politician who is used to receiving his or her strategic education via PowerPoint slides.
As to the merit in Thucydides, one can do no better than to quote the opinion of one of America’s most outstanding soldiers, General of the Army George Catlin Marshall. Speaking at Princeton University on February 22, 1947, Marshall, then Secretary of State, expressed the view that he harbored grave doubts as to “whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep conviction regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.xxii  That could be a perfect quote for a book’s jacket endorsement.
Clausewitz, Sun-tzu and Thucydides should all be read and reread: they are not alternatives. Neither, of course, are they the last word, not even when regarded collectively. Clausewitz in particular has attracted a great deal of hostile commentary, especially in Britain, for his alleged preference for battle on a large scale.xxiii However it suffices to say that, to date at least, none of his critics has laid a serious glove on him, though it has not been for want of trying.
Each of the five works cited earlier as second tier contributions to our understanding of strategy each has solid, if limited, merit. In the judgment of a majority of strategic theorist each either is, or is likely to be, recognized as a strategic classic. Jomini’s Art of War is crammed with sensible reasoning and good advice, as well as, one must add, much that is better ignored. Liddell Hart has useful things to say about grand strategy in contrast to the more narrow military strategy, while Edward N. Luttwak breaks new ground in his exhaustive examination of strategy’s uniquely paradoxical nature.
J.C. Wylie’s Military Strategy is probably the finest general study of strategy in any language written in the past century. His central idea is profoundly Clausewitz an, and this is entirely appropriate. Wylie claims persuasively that the ultimate object of strategy is control over the enemy. This seemingly simple notion is actually rather sophisticated. It is an admirable complement to Clausewitz’s insistence that in war our object is “to impose our will on the enemy.” xxiv All too often commanders have behaved, indeed have been permitted to behave, as if the object of using military force in action is to cause death and destruction as ends in and of themselves.
Finally, Machiavelli’s Art of War, apart from its overdone admiration for long lost Roman merits, real and imagined, is a goldmine of good advice and prudent reasoning on statecraft and the conduct of war as an instrument of policy.

Conclusion







This article has argued that there is a general theory of strategy which has profound significance as a source of necessary education for politicians and generals and those who would criticize them. We are fortunate in possessing three works of the highest value, true classics by any definition, in Clausewitz’s On War, Sun-tzu’s Art of War and Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. These three works, collectively, must form the basis of anyone’s strategic education. They have no rivals in any language. The fact that these three classics were written so far apart chronologically (400 BC – 1832), in such different cultural contexts (ancient China, ancient Greece, nineteenth century Prussia), and in such distinctive ways (a briefing for the Emperor, a history book, a philosophical treatise), adds immeasurably to the confidence which we can place in them.
This article appeared at Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
Notes:
1. Cohen Eliot A., “A Revolution in Warfare, Foreign Affairs,” March/April 1996, pp. 37-54.
2. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 31, 336.
3. See Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, Survival, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 33-54.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1832; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.
5. See Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy”, in Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 22.
6. See Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).
7. Geoffrey P. Megargee, War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006).
8. Bernard Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War”, in Clausewitz, On War, 53.
9. Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War, edited by Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 47.
10. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and also John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), ch. 7.
11. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 452.
12. On the concept and reality of strategic history, see Mazarr Michael J., The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework, Washington, CSIS, March 1993.
13. Sun-tzu, The Art of War, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer (ca. 400 BC; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
14. Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to “The Peloponnesian War,” edited by Robert D. Strassler (ca. 400 BC; New York: The Free Press, 1996).
15. Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (1838; London: Greenhill Books, 1992).
16. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, revised edition (1987; Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001)
17. J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989).
18. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, translated by Henry Neville (1520; Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2006).
19. Clausewitz, On War, op. cit., 89.
20. The similarity of argument among the classics is a major theme of Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd edition (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
21. Sun-tzu, The Art of War, 179.
22. General George C. Marshall, quoted in Paul A. Rahe, “Thucydides as educator”, in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 99.
23. The anti-Clausewitz literature is roughly handled in Christopher Bassford, John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic, War in History, Vol. 1, No.3 (November 1994): 319–36.
24. Clausewitz, On War, op. cit., 75.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR








Richard Rousseau
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan. He teaches on Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization. He can be reached at rrousseau9@hotmail.com or rrousseau@khazar.org