SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/20022017-gorkhas-of-the-indian-army-and-india-nepal-relations-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

Gorkhas Of The Indian Army And India-Nepal Relations – Analysis

                            By      Vikrant Deshpande

Indian Army soldiers with the 99th Mountain Brigade's 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons.

BY IDSA

 FEBRUARY 20, 2017

This article is inspired by the Annual Gorkha Brigade Conference held at New Delhi on 11 February 2017 and the unique model of military diplomacy it fosters between India and Nepal. The Gorkha Brigade is an association representing approximately 40,000 Indian and Nepali Gorkha soldiers as well as about 90,000 Indian Army pensioners in Nepal. The Brigade comprises seven regiments, viz, First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Gorkha Rifles. The missing serials were allotted to the British Army on India’s independence. Each regiment is further organised into five or six infantry battalions, which is the basic, fully independent, and functional unit of the Indian Army.

Thus 3/9 GR denotes the Third Battalion of the Ninth Gorkha Rifles, an exclusive classification which has baffled many within and outside the armed forces fraternity. The Gorkha Brigade also encompasses the Defence Wing of the Embassy of India in Nepal and the Gorkha Recruiting Depots of Gorakhpur and Ghoom (Darjeeling). The President of the Gorkha Brigade is always the senior most serving officer from amongst the seven regiments; presently, the Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, a second generation officer of the Eleventh Gorkha Rifles, has that honour.

This year the Gorkha Brigade is also celebrating the bicentenary of one of its oldest regiments, the Ninth Gorkha Rifles. The First Battalion of the Ninth Gorkhas was raised by the British in 1817 as the ‘Fatehgarh Levy’. Contrary to popular belief that the British were the first to recruit Gorkhas, it was in fact Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who, impressed by the bravery and valour of these big hearted little men from the hills, raised a battalion of Gorkhas to serve in the Sikh Army in 1809.

As a result, all soldiers serving in the Indian Army are still called ‘Lahorey’ in Nepal, i.e., those who serve in Lahore – the capital of Ranjit Singh’s empire. The celebrations of the bicentenary commenced with a Motorcycle Rally of 1/9 GR flagged off by General Rawat on 30 January from Delhi. The motorcyclists drove through the traditional recruiting areas of the Regiment in Western Nepal honouring many ex-servicemen en route. Their arrival in Pokhra in Nepal on 4 February coincided with a massive rally where almost 3,500 ex-servicemen and widows had gathered to celebrate the bicentenary of the Regiment. The event was attended by General Rajendra Chhetri, Chief of Army Staff, Nepal Army, Shri Ranjit Rae, Ambassador of India to Nepal, and Lt. Gen. AK Bhatt, Colonel of the Regiment of the Ninth Gorkhas. India and Nepal share a unique tradition wherein their respective Chiefs of Army Staff are anointed as Honorary Generals of the other’s forces. General Rajendra Chettri is already an Honorary General of the Indian Army and General Bipin Rawat is likely to be conferred the reciprocal honour on his first visit to Nepal.

Ex-servicemen welfare is a state subject in India, with the Indian Army and the Ministry of Defence having only a limited role in it. However, Nepal being a Sovereign Nation, the welfare of Nepal-domiciled ex-servicemen of the Indian Armed Forces and pensioners of the Central or State Government including para-military forces is the responsibility of the Embassy of India in Nepal. The Government of India owes a debt to these citizens of Nepal for having dedicated their lives in service of our nation and the Defence Wing of the Embassy carries out this onerous task, a model without parallel in the world, with exemplary efficiency. Here, it would be pertinent to explain the range of its activities.

The Defence Wing of the Embassy has three Pension Paying Offices at Kathmandu, Pokhara and Dharan, each handled by a serving officer of the Indian Army under the Defence Attaché. Approximately 1,27,000 pensioners (90,000 of the Indian Army and 37,000 of the Central and State Governments as well as para-military) draw pensions from these offices. About 30,000 of these pensioners are paid pensions directly in their respective bank accounts. The rest reside in areas yet to be covered by banking infrastructure and draw their pensions in cash. The Pension Paying Offices carry out 36 payment camps every year in various remote locations, some accessible only on foot, to disburse these pensions. It is to the credit of this organisation that it has completed the payment of One Rank One Pension arrears to all pensioners in Nepal. The total amount disbursed as pensions and arrears in this financial year is likely to exceed INR 2,500 crore or Nepali Rupee (NR) 4,000 crore, and possibly reach INR 3000 crore or NR 4,800 crore per annum by 2018/19.1

At a conservative estimate, the 32,000 Nepal domiciled serving soldiers remit approximately INR 1,000 crore equivalent to NR 1,600 crore per year.2 This total at approximately NR 6,400 crore is almost equivalent of 63 per cent of the total foreign grant in aid received by the Government of Nepal from all donor countries for the year 2016/17at NR 10,689.64 crores and greater than its own allocation for Defence at NR 3601.80 crore.3 Further, this figure does not include remuneration received by Nepali citizens as other employees of the Indian Government; there is no definitive figure available for the numbers of such personnel. The pensioner’s ratio does offer some basis for extrapolation wherein these pensioners form approximately 21 per cent of the total pensioners of the Indian Government. It can therefore be assumed that a similar ratio is in service at any given point of time with the Government of India and, if their remittances were to be added, the figures would further increase.

The Indian Ex-servicemen Welfare Organisation in Nepal (IEWON) is an independent organisation chaired by the Ambassador of India with representation from senior officials from the Governments of Nepal and India. It functions under the aegis of the Defence Wing of the Embassy and is responsible for the welfare of the Nepal-domiciled pensioners of the Government of India. In an exceptional decision, the Government of India chose to execute its social welfare activities through its ex-servicemen residing in Nepal. These ex-servicemen have shown exemplary zeal, honesty and determination in executing these social welfare projects, most of which are drinking water projects in remote hilly areas where drinking water is an acute problem. This has not only empowered these ex-servicemen and enhanced their status in society but also created more than one lakh ambassadors for Brand India and the values that it stands for. The IEWON also carries out other welfare activities including the provision of educational scholarships and vocational training for the wards of pensioners through 22 District Soldier Boards manned by Ex-servicemen it employs all over Nepal. The total annual budget of these welfare schemes is approximately INR 5.5 to 6 crore.4

The Government of India also provides opportunity to any citizen of Nepal to serve as an officer in the Indian Armed Forces, a fact that goes unnoticed in the haze and smoke surrounding Indo-Nepal relations. Some Nepali citizens have already risen to the rank of Major/Lieutenant General or equivalent. This displays the amount of trust and faith that India has on the citizens of Nepal. A Nepali youth has twin opportunities compared to his Indian counterpart; he can either join the Nepal Army or the Indian Armed Forces. No country in the world has opened its armed forces to a neighbour in this manner besides the other aspects of this special relationship like the open border. Different studies estimate the number of Nepalis working or residing in India to be between one and 1.6 million. The Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty of 2009 provides special treatment to industrial products of Nepal to promote development of industry in that nation on a non-reciprocal basis.5 Many Indian industries like Dabur have shifted production to Nepal as it is cheaper to produce in Nepal and distribute in India. There have been occasions when this special arrangement has been questioned by myopic interests on either side: Indians questioning the need to recruit Gorkhas when an ample recruitable population exists in the country; and Nepalis objecting to the impropriety of sovereign citizens of Nepal serving another country. This petty squabbling ignores the geo-political reality of a land locked Nepal hemmed in by the Himalayas to the North and India to the South as well as India’s moral obligations therein. It also ignores the fact that Nepal does not have the wherewithal, infrastructure and industry to provide employment for its bulging youth population. India provides the only viable option for their gainful employment and for the remittances therein.

A comparison with the British Gurkhas6 is inevitable here as even Great Britain maintains this special bond. The British have reduced their four Gurkha regiments existing in 1947 to one and this has two infantry battalions. Though the exact strength of British Gurkhas has not been mentioned on their website, an approximation, given the units and subunits mentioned, would be about 3,500 men.7 The number of British Gurkha pensioners residing in Nepal is dwindling as the majority choose to settle down in Britain after the British parliament voted to offer British Gurkhas the right to settle in the UK in 2009.8 The contrasts with the Indian relationship are glaring if only because of the sheer numbers involved.

This author had the opportunity to meet several pensioners from Nepal at a regimental reunion at Ranchi.9 Each one was immensely proud of his service in the Indian Army and grateful for the pensions and welfare activities being provided to them. They were especially happy with the recent extension of the Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) to private hospitals in Nepal as also the extension of canteen facilities to pensioners in Nepal. Similarly, every senior Indian Army officer of the Gorkhas at the Gorkha Brigade Conference spoke of the exemplary qualities of the Gorkha soldiers. One of the Generals said that the Nation was grateful to these citizens of Nepal for their service and no amount of pensions or welfare activities can truly repay the debt that India owes these brave warriors. This unique bond is the core of Indo-Nepal friendship. Irrespective of the noise and clutter that surrounds this relationship, both governments need to nurture this core and build on the foundation it offers so that the association contributes to the Comprehensive National Security of both nations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/gorkhas-indian-army-and-india-nepal-relations_vdeshpande_140217

• 1. The 2016 issue of Bhu Puu, the annual journal of the Indian Ex-servicemen Welfare organization in Nepal, states that INR 1,974 crore were disbursed in FY 2015/16. Extrapolating an increase of 10 per cent, which is the average increase of dearness allowance every year, would put that figure for FY 2017/18 at approximately INR 2,400 crore. This does not include the arrears being paid for One Rank One Pension and Seventh Pay Commission, which would exceed Rs. 100 crore even by a conservative estimate of Rs. 10,000 per head and could reach 1,000 crore if the arrears were to the tune of 100,000 per head. The final figure disbursed is likely to rest at approximately INR 3,000 crores if not in FY 2017/2018 then definitely in FY 2018/2019.
• 2. The average Indian Soldier draws approximately INR 33,000 per month, out of which he remits approximately 25,000 per month.
• 3. “Summary of Expenditure Allocation for Fiscal Year 2016/17,” Red Book of Ministry of Finance Nepal, accessed on 13 February 2017.
• 4. Bhu Puu 2016, pp. 17-21.
• 5. Revised Indo–Nepal Treaty of Trade 2009, accessed on 17 February 2017.
• 6. The British still use ‘Gurkha’ while the Indian spelling has been amended to ‘Gorkha’ as per the correct Nepali pronunciation.
• 7. The official British Gurkhas website, accessed on 16 February 2017.
• 8. “Gurkhas Win The Right to Settle in UK,” BBC News, 21 May 2009, accessed on 17 February 2017.
• 9. The Regiment had hired several Luxury Coaches and all these pensioners traveled from Nepal by road to Ranchi to be at the reunion.

     Topics      Foreign PolicyIndiaMilitaryNepalSecuritySouth Asia

India: Inadequate Budgetary Allotment And Defence Preparedness

SOURCE:http://www.eurasiareview.com/24022017-india-inadequate-budgetary-allotment-and-defence-preparedness-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

India: Inadequate Budgetary Allotment And Defence Preparedness – Analysis

                               By 

                   Gurmeet Kanwal*

Indian Army soldiers. Photo Credit: US DoD, SGT Mike MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons.

FEBRUARY 24, 2017

In the budget for the Financial Year (FY) 2017-18, presented in the Indian parliament on 1 February 2017, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been allotted INR 2,74,114 crore, excluding the provision for pensions.

The nominal increase of 5.7 per cent over the revised estimates (RE) for FY 2016-17 is barely adequate to provide for domestic inflation. The increase is insufficient to cater to the increase in the pay and allowances of the armed forces and the civilian employees of the MoD consequent to the implementation of the recommendations of the Seventh Pay Commission.

The additional expenditure that needs to be incurred on account of the upward revision in pay and allowances has resulted in an increase in the share of expenditure planned on the revenue account in the defence budget and a corresponding decrease in the share of the expenditure on the capital account.

While revenue expenditure has increased from 65.3 per cent of the total budget in FY 2016-17 to 67.0 per cent, expenditure planned on the capital account has gone down from 34.7 to 33.0 per cent.

The total capital outlay for the next financial year – meant mainly for the acquisition of new weapons systems and defence equipment – is pegged at INR 86,488.01 crore. Though the government has been making efforts to encourage the acquisition of weapons systems and defence equipment through the “make in India” route, about 70 per cent of the requirements are still imported.

The 10.05 per cent increase in the capital budget over the budgetary estimates (BE) for FY 2016-17 (INR 78,586.68 crore) is barely adequate to compensate for the 10 to 15 per cent inflation per annum in the prices of weapons and defence equipment procured through imports. The amount actually spent on the capital account in FY 2016-17 is INR 71,700.00 crore (RE). A sum of INR 6,886 crore was transferred to the revenue account.

The customs duty now being imposed on defence imports and the drop in the value of the Indian Rupee against the US Dollar also make the import of weapons and equipment comparatively more expensive. The Rupee had dropped to 68.71 to one US Dollar on 24 November 2016 – its lowest level during the year.

Despite low levels of funding on the capital account, allocations continue to be surrendered almost every year or transferred to the revenue budget. All of these systemic weaknesses work in tandem and, consequently, the modernisation plans of the armed forces are adversely affected.

As a ratio of the country’s GDP, the defence expenditure planned for FY 2017-18 stands reduced to 1.62 per cent. This is the lowest level since the disastrous 1962 war with China when it was 1.59 per cent of the GDP and is grossly inadequate to meet India’s growing threats and challenges and the need for military modernisation.

The allocation for defence must go up to at least 2.0 per cent of the GDP in the supplementary demands for FY 2017-18. It should be raised gradually to 3.0 per cent of the GDP as recommended repeatedly by the Standing Committee on Defence in Parliament if another military debacle is to be avoided.

According to a press release issued by the MoD, the Defence Acquisition Council chaired by India’s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had accorded initial approval – referred to as acceptance of necessity (AON) – to defence procurement projects worth INR 2,39,000 crore till July 2016. Of this, contracts worth INR 1,13,995 crore had been signed. At a DAC meeting held in November 2016, AON was given for new procurement projects worth INR 82,117 crore.

The new projects include the purchase of 83 Tejas Mark 1A Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) for the Indian Air Force at a cost of INR 50,025 crore; 15 helicopters for the IAF and the Indian Army at a cost of INR 2,911 crore; 598 mini-UAVs for the army at a cost of INR 1,100 crore; and 464 T-90 Russian tanks at a cost of INR 13,448 crore.

Given the low availability of funds on the capital account and the ‘committed liabilities’ of previous years – previously negotiated contracts with a fixed annual outgo, It will be difficult for the MoD to find the funds that will be required to sign contracts to acquire even half the weapons and equipment for which AON has been accorded in November 2016.

In FY 2017-18, funds amounting to only about INR 5,000 crore are likely to be available for new weapons and equipment acquisitions. Assuming the first year’s payment to be 10 per cent of the total, contracts worth about INR 50,000 crore may be concluded.

A workable method needs to be found to overcome the inability of the MoD bureaucracy and the armed forces to spend the funds allotted on the capital account fully and to curb the tendency of India’s Ministry of Finance to allow part of the allotted funds to lapse as a tool to manage the burgeoning fiscal deficit.

In the interim budget that he presented for FY 2004-05, the then Indian Finance Minister Jaswant Singh had made an excellent recommendation. He had proposed to introduce a non-lapsable, rolling defence modernisation fund worth INR 25,000 crore. It was an innovative measure that did not find favour with the then Congress-led UPA government that presented the full budget after it came to power.

The reason given then was that the ‘rules of business’ do not permit a non-lapsable fund as all unspent funds compulsorily lapse at midnight on 31 March at the end of the financial year.

Such a roll-on fund is known to have been in vogue during the British rule. Since then, the rules of business have not changed substantially. And, even if the rules of business need to be amended now, surely a constitutional amendment is not necessary to do so.

It is an inescapable national security imperative that a roll-on, non-lapsable defence modernisation fund be instituted with a corpus of INR 1,00,000 crore. It should be linked with the Consolidated Fund of India.

Besides being a statement of account, the defence budget is a tool for demonstrating the country’s resolve and for enhancing deterrence through signalling. Infirmity in the approach to the formulation of the defence budget creates the impression that the management of national security does not rate a very high priority. That is not a worthy message to send out from the premises of the Indian parliament.

Overall, with the present defence budget, operational preparedness will deteriorate further even as the threats and challenges continue to increase. And, military modernisation, which had just about begun to pick up steam, will stagnate once again.

* Gurmeet Kanwal
Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)

TOPICS:

EconomicsIndiaMlitarySouth Asia

Operation Opera - Israel Airstrike on Iraq Nuclear Reactor 1981

SOURCE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWA2pthTBiM





           Operation Opera - Israel Airstrike

               on Iraq Nuclear Reactor 1981


                                      [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWA2pthTBiM ]

Published on Sep 26, 2015

Operation Opera, also known as Operation Babylon and Raid on the Reactor, was a surprise Israeli air strike carried out on 7 June 1981, which destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction 17 kilometers, 10.5 miles, southeast of Baghdad. The operation came after Iran's unsuccessful Operation Scorch Sword operation had caused minor damage to the same nuclear facility the previous year, the damage having been subsequently repaired by French technicians. Operation Opera, and related Israeli government statements following it, established the Begin Doctrine, which explicitly stated the strike was not an anomaly, but instead “a precedent for every future government in Israel.” Israel's counter-proliferation preventive strike added another dimension to their existing policy, as it related to the nuclear capability of other states in the region. 

In 1976, Iraq purchased an "Osiris"-class nuclear reactor from France. While Iraq and France maintained that the reactor, named Osirak by the French, was intended for peaceful scientific research, the Israelis viewed the reactor with suspicion, and said that it was designed to make nuclear weapons. On 7 June 1981, a flight of Israeli Air Force F-16A fighter aircraft, with an escort of F-15As, bombed and heavily damaged the Osirak reactor. Israel claimed it acted in self-defense, and that the reactor had "less than a month to go" before "it might have become critical.Ten Iraqi soldiers and one French civilian were killed. 

The attack was strongly criticized around the world, including in the United States, and Israel was rebuked by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in two separate resolutions. 

After Operation Desert Storm, the free world quietly praised Israel for eliminating Iraq's Nuclear Treat, including France. Fact is, Iraq had plenty of oil for energy and absolutely no need for a nuclear reactor, except to research and build nuclear weapons.



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                                       PART - 2
SOURCE :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Opera


                 OPERATION  OPERA

Operation Opera
Part of Arab–Israeli Conflict
Operational scope	Strategic
Location	Baghdad, Iraq 33°12′30″N 44°31′30″E
Planned by	Menachem Begin (Prime Minister) David Ivry (Air Force commander)
Objective	Destruction of the Osirak nuclear reactor
Date	7 June 1981
Executed by	Israeli Air Force
Outcome	Successful, reactor destroyed
Casualties	10 Iraqi soldiers killed 1 French civilian killed

Israeli Air Force F-16A Netz 243, flown by Colonel Ilan Ramon in Operation Opera

Nose of F-16A 243 showing the triangular mission marking for the attack, a nuclear reactor silhouette against the Iraqi Air Force emblem.

Operation Opera (Hebrew: אופרה‎‎),^[1] also known as Operation Babylon,^[2] was a surprise Israeli air strike carried out on 7 June 1981, which destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction 17 kilometers (10.5 miles) southeast of Baghdad.^[3][4][5] The operation came after Iran's unsuccessful Operation Scorch Sword operation had caused minor damage to the same nuclear facility the previous year, the damage having been subsequently repaired by French technicians. Operation Opera, and related Israeli government statements following it, established the Begin Doctrine, which explicitly stated the strike was not an anomaly, but instead “a precedent for every future government in Israel.” Israel's counter-proliferation preventive strike added another dimension to their existing policy of deliberate ambiguity, as it related to the nuclear capability of other states in the region.^[6]

In 1976, Iraq purchased an "Osiris"-class nuclear reactor from France.^[7][8] While Iraq and France maintained that the reactor, named Osirak by the French, was intended for peaceful scientific research,^[9] the Israelis viewed the reactor with suspicion, and said that it was designed to make nuclear weapons.^[3] On 7 June 1981, a flight of Israeli Air Force F-16A fighter aircraft, with an escort of F-15As, bombed and heavily damaged the Osirak reactor.^[10] Israel claimed it acted in self-defense, and that the reactor had "less than a month to go" before "it might have become critical."^[11] Ten Iraqi soldiers and one French civilian were killed.^[12] The attack took place about three weeks before the elections for the Knesset.^[13]

The attack was strongly criticized around the world, including in the United States, and Israel was rebuked by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in two separate resolutions.^[14][15] Media reactions were no less negative: "Israel's sneak attack ... was an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression", wrote the New York Times, while the Los Angeles Times called it "state-sponsored terrorism".^[14]The destruction of Osirak has been cited as an example of a preventive strike in contemporary scholarship on international law.^[16][17] The exact efficiency of the attack is debated by historians^[18] - it took Iraq off the brink of nuclear capability but drove its weapons program underground and cemented Saddam's ambitions of acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite international opprobrium, Operation Opera would help to secure the successful liberation of Kuwait and diminished the risk of terrorist groups in the region obtaining nuclear weapons, though it also heightened preexisting tensions with Iraq, making a future confrontation between the two powers more likely.^[19]

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1Iraq's nuclear program
• 2Strategy and diplomacy
  • 2.1Iranian attack
  • 2.2Operational planning
  • 2.3Preliminary Israeli/Iranian actions
• 3The attack
• 4International political reactions
  • 4.1Aftermath
• 5Assessment
• 6See also
• 7References
• 8Bibliography
• 9Further reading
• 10External links

                         IRAQ"S  NUCLEAR PROGRAM

        Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iraq had established a nuclear program sometime in the 1960s, and in the mid-1970s looked to expand it through the acquisition of a nuclear reactor.^[20] After failing to convince the French Government to sell them a gas cooled graphite moderated plutonium-producing reactor and reprocessing plant, and likewise failing to convince the Italian government to sell them a Cirene reactor, the Iraqi government convinced the French government to sell them an Osiris-class research reactor.^[21][22] The purchase also included a smaller accompanying Isis-type reactor, the sale of 72 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium and the training of personnel.^[23] The total cost has been given as $300 million.^[24] In November 1975 the countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement and in 1976 the sale of the reactor was finalized.^[21]

Construction for the 40-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor began in 1979 at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center near Baghdad.^[25] The main reactor was dubbed Osirak (Osiraq) by the French, blending the name of Iraq with that of the reactor class. Iraq named the main reactor Tammuz 1 (Arabic: تموز) and the smaller Tammuz 2.^[26] Tammuz was the Babylonian month when the Ba'ath party had come to power in 1968.^[27] On 6 April 1979, Israeli agents sabotaged the Osirak reactor awaiting shipment to Iraq at La Seyne-sur-Mer in France.^[28] On the 14 June 1980, Mossad agents assassinated Yahya El Mashad, an Egyptian nuclear scientist who headed the Iraqi nuclear program, in a hotel in Paris, France.^[29][30][31] In July 1980, Iraq received from France a shipment of approximately 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium fuel to be used in the reactor. The shipment was the first of a planned six deliveries totalling 72 kilograms.^[32] It was reportedly stipulated in the purchase agreement that no more than two HEU fuel loadings, 24 kilograms, could be in Iraq at any time.^[33]

Iraq and France claimed that the Iraqi reactor was intended for peaceful scientific research.^[9] Agreements between France and Iraq excluded military use.^[34] The American private intelligence agency STRATFOR wrote in 2007 that the uranium-fueled reactor "was believed to be on the verge of producing plutonium for a weapons program".^[35] In a 2003 speech, Richard Wilson, a professor of physics at Harvard University who visually inspected the partially damaged reactor in December 1982, said that "to collect enough plutonium [for a nuclear weapon] using Osirak would've taken decades, not years".^[36] In 2005, Wilson further commented in The Atlantic:

the Osirak reactor that was bombed by Israel in June 1981 was explicitly designed by the French engineer Yves Girard to be unsuitable for making bombs. That was obvious to me on my 1982 visit.^[37]

Elsewhere Wilson has stated that

Many claim that the bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor delayed Iraq's nuclear bomb program. But the Iraqi nuclear program before 1981 was peaceful, and the Osirak reactor was not only unsuited to making bombs but was under intensive safeguards.^[38]

In an interview in 2012, Wilson again emphasised: "The Iraqis couldn't have been developing a nuclear weapon at Osirak. I challenge any scientist in the world to show me how they could have done so."^[39]

Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, placing its reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.^[20] In October 1981, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published excerpts from the testimony of Roger Richter, a former IAEA inspector who described the weaknesses of the agency's nuclear safeguards to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Richter testified that only part of Iraq's nuclear installation was under safeguard and that the most sensitive facilities were not even subject to safeguards.^[40] IAEA's Director-General Sigvard Eklund issued a rebuttal saying that Richter had never inspected Osirak and had never been assigned to inspect facilities in the Middle East.^[40] Eklund claimed that the safeguards procedures were effective and that they were supplemented by precautionary measures taken by the nuclear suppliers.^[40] Anthony Fainberg, a physicist at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, disputed Richter's claim that a fuel processing program for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons could have been conducted secretly.^[40] Fainberg wrote that there was barely enough fuel on the site to make one bomb, and that the presence of hundreds of foreign technicians would have made it impossible for the Iraqis to take the necessary steps without being discovered.^[5]

         STRAREGY  AND  DIPLOMACY

In Israel, discussions on which strategy to adopt in response to the Iraqi reactor development were taking place as early as Yitzhak Rabin's first term in office (1974–1977).^[41] Reportedly, planning and training for the operation began during this time.^[41] After Menachem Begin became Prime Minister in 1977 the preparations intensified; Begin authorized the building of a full-scale model of the Iraqi reactor which Israeli pilots could practice bombing.^[42] Three Israeli pilots died in accidents while training for the mission.^[43]

Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan initiated diplomatic negotiations with France, the United States and Italy (Israel maintained that some Italian firms acted as suppliers and sub-contractors) over the matter but failed to obtain assurances that the reactor program would be halted. In addition Israel was not able to convince the French governments of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand to cease aiding the Iraqi nuclear program.^[44] Saddam Hussein consistently maintained that Osirak was intended for peaceful purposes.^[45] Begin considered the diplomatic options fruitless, and worried that prolonging the decision to attack would lead to a fatal inability to act in response to the perceived threat.^[17] According to Karl P. Mueller, in the spring of 1979, Begin had reached the conclusion that an anticipatory attack was necessary.^[46]

Anthony Cordesman writes that Israel conducted a series of clandestine operations to halt construction or destroy the reactor.^[47] In April 1979, Israeli agents in France allegedly planted a bomb that destroyed the reactor's first set of core structures while they were awaiting shipment to Iraq.^[47] In June 1980, Israeli agents are said to have assassinated Yehia El-Mashad, an Egyptian atomic scientist working on the Iraqi nuclear program.^[48][49] It has also been claimed that Israel bombed several of the French and Italian companies it suspected of working on the project, and sent threatening letters to top officials and technicians.^[47][49][50] Following the bombing in April 1979, France inserted a clause in its agreement with Iraq saying that French personnel would have to supervise the Osirak reactor on-site for a period of ten years.^[48]

  

               IRANIAN  ATTACK  

Main article: Operation Scorch Sword

Iran attacked and damaged the site on 30 September 1980, with two F-4 Phantoms, shortly after the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War.^[51] At the onset of the war, Yehoshua Saguy, director of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, publicly urged the Iranians to bomb the reactor.^[51][52] The attack was the first on a nuclear reactor and only the third on a nuclear facility in history. It was also the first instance of a preventive attack on a nuclear reactor which aimed to forestall the development of a nuclear weapon.^[52][53][54]

Due to last minute Iranian concerns that the reactor had been already fueled and could release radioactive fallout if hit, they did not attack the actual reactor dome, but the control room, research/centrifuge facilities, and the adjacent buildings. The targets were struck and the buildings were damaged, along with the plant cooling mechanisms.^[55] Two other F-4s simultaneously hit Baghdad's main power plant, knocking the city's electricity out for nearly two days. The Iraqis denied any major damage. The French and Italian technicians promptly left Iraq, and nearly withdrew from the project, but some later returned in February 1981 and began to repair the damage.^[55]

Trita Parsi, in the book Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, writes that a senior Israeli official met with a representative of the Ayatollah Khomeini in France one month prior to the Israeli attack.^[56] The source of the assertion is Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli government employee. At the alleged meeting, the Iranians explained details of their 1980 attack on the site, and agreed to let Israeli planes land at an Iranian airfield in Tabriz in the case of an emergency.^[56] While the new Iranian government was officially hostile to Israel, due to both nations having a common enemy (Iraq), and Iranian fears that the Iraqis would create an atomic bomb to use on them, they clandestinely worked with Israel to forestall such a development.^[55]

OPERATION PLANNING  

Scheme of operation

The distance between Israeli military bases and the reactor site was significant—over 1,600 km (990 mi).^[57] The Israeli planes would have to violate Jordanian and/or Saudi airspace in a covert flight over foreign territory, making mid-air refueling unfeasible.^[43][58][59] The Israelis eventually concluded that a squadron of heavily fueled and heavily armed F-16As, with a group of F-15As to provide air cover and fighter support, could perform a surgical strike to eliminate the reactor site without having to refuel.^[60]

The decision to go through with the operation was hotly contested within Begin's government.^[61] Ariel Sharon, a member of the Security Cabinet, later said that he was among those who advocated bombing the reactor.^[62]Dayan, Defense Minister (until late 1980) Ezer Weizman and Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin were among those opposed.^[46] According to Mueller, "the principal difference between the hawks and doves on this issue lay in their estimation of the likely international political costs of an air strike".^[46] Shai Feldman specifies that "[those opposed] feared that the operation would derail the fragile Israeli-Egyptian peace process, fuel Arab anxieties about Israel's profile in the region, and damage Israel-French relations".^[63] Begin and his supporters, including Sharon, were far less pessimistic than their opponents about the political fallout.^[46] Yehoshua Saguy argued for continued efforts in trying to find a non-military solution as it would take the Iraqis five to ten years to produce the material necessary for a nuclear weapon.^[61] In the end, Begin chose to order the attack based on a worst-case estimate where a weapon could be created in one to two years time.^[61]

Prime Minister Begin defended the timing of the bombing stating that a later attack, after the reactor had become operational, could cause lethal radioactive contamination doses to reach all the way to Baghdad.^[25][64] An analysis by Warren Donnelly of the United States Congressional Research Service concluded that "it would be most unlikely for an attack with conventional bombs upon the reactor when operating to have caused lethal exposures to radioactivity in Baghdad, although some people at the reactor site might receive some exposure".^[65] This was similarly the conclusion of Herbert Goldstein of Columbia University using IAEA release factors, the lethal contamination would be confined to a close proximity to the reactor and small amounts of radiation would be detectable in Baghdad under the assumption that winds were blowing in that direction.^[66]

In October 1980, Mossad reported to Begin that the Osirak reactor would be fueled and operational by June 1981.^[58] This assessment was significantly aided by reconnaissance photos supplied by the United States, specifically using the KH-11 KENNAN satellite.^[43]French technicians installing the reactor later said it was scheduled to become operational only by the end of 1981.^[43] Nonetheless, in October 1980, the Israeli cabinet (with Dayan absent) finally voted 10–6 in favor of launching the attack.^[46]

PRELIMINARY ISRAELI/ IRANIAN                                             ACTIONS 

Main article: Attack on H3

After the approval for Operation Opera, the Israelis began to plan their mission against Osirak. The basic procedure for the airstrike had been formulated as early as 1979.^[55] However, the Israelis needed photographic intelligence about the layout of the plant. That task allegedly fell to the Iranians.^[55] Rather than carrying out a follow up air raid after their September attack, on November 30, 1980, an Iranian F-4 Phantom reconnaissance jet took pictures of the Osirak reactor.


The photographs were allegedly placed in a top-secret metal container, and certain elements of the Iranian military delivered them to the Israelis. With these photographs, the Israelis began to plan out Operation Opera.^[55]

A team of Israeli pilots using A-4 Skyhawk aircraft began practicing over the Mediterranean Sea for the raid. The Israelis shortly afterwards received their first agreed delivery of F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft (the first batch was originally earmarked for Iran, but because of their revolution, the Israeli airforce received theirs ahead of schedule). The new F-16s would be used for the raid.^[55] Israeli F-4 Phantoms also ran reconnaissance missions over areas of southern and western Iraq. While the Iraqi air force was busy fighting the Iranians and did not notice most of the time. On one occasion, an Iraqi Mig-21 chased an Israeli F-4. The Iraqi jet ran out of fuel and the pilot was forced to eject.^[55] However, in their missions, the Israelis discovered a blind area on Iraqi radar. It was on the border with Saudi Arabia. While the Iraqis were aware of the blind area, they did not remedy the problem because they did not expect a war with Saudi Arabia.^[55]

The Iraqi air force was a potential threat to the Israelis (as the Mig-21 interception showed) and it somewhat deterred Israel from attacking yet.^[55] However, Israel had an advantage in that Iraq was preoccupied fighting Iran. On April 4, 1981, the Iranian Air Force launched a major attack on Iraq's H-3 airbase in the western part of the country (near Jordan and Israel). Eight Iranian F-4 Phantoms carried out the long range bombing mission and struck the airbase.^[55][67] Iran claimed that 48 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed, although US intelligence concluded that 27 aircraft were destroyed and 11 others damaged (some beyond repair). Among the aircraft hit were two Tu-22 Blinder and three Tu-16 Badger strategic bombers (which could have been used to retaliate against Israel in the event of an attack).^[55] The attack was a severe blow to Iraqi airpower, and largely gave Iran air superiority over Iraq.^[67] Israeli reconnaissance planes had been monitoring Iraq during the attack, and observed that Iraq's air force had been severely degraded and their retaliatory capacity had been weakened.^[55]

  THE  ATTACK

Yehuda Blum, in a speech to the United Nations Security Council following the attack, claimed that the operation was launched on a Sunday afternoon under the assumption that workers present on the site, including foreign experts employed at the reactor, would have left.^[11] Notwithstanding this precaution, there were hundreds of French workers and other nationals at the plant at the time of the raid.^[42]

The attack squadron consisted of eight F-16As, each with two unguided Mark-84 2,000-pound delay-action bombs.^[58] A flight of six F-15As was assigned to the operation to provide fighter support.^[43] The F-16 pilots were Ze'ev Raz, Amos Yadlin, Dobbi Yaffe, Hagai Katz, Amir Nachumi, Iftach Spector, Relik Shafir, and Ilan Ramon. Raz led the attack, was later decorated by the Chief of Staff for his leadership. Ramon, who was the youngest pilot to participate in the operation, later became the first Israeli astronaut and died in the Columbia space shuttle disaster).^[68]

On 7 June 1981, at 15:55 local time (12:55 GMT), the operation was initiated. The Israeli planes left Etzion Airbase, flying unchallenged in Jordanian and Saudi airspace.^[60] To avoid detection, the Israeli pilots conversed in Saudi-accented Arabic while in Jordanian airspace and told Jordanian air controllers that they were a Saudi patrol that had gone off course.^[42] While flying over Saudi Arabia, they pretended to be Jordanians, using Jordanian radio signals and formations.^[42][69] The Israeli planes were so heavily loaded that the external fuel tanks that had been mounted on the planes were exhausted in-flight. The tanks were jettisoned over the Saudi desert.^[60]

En route to the target, the Israeli planes crossed the Gulf of Aqaba. Unknowingly, the squadron flew directly over the yacht of King Hussein of Jordan, who was vacationing in the Gulf at the time.^[70] Hussein witnessed the planes overfly his yacht, and noticed their Israeli markings. Taking into account the location, heading, and armament of the jets, Hussein quickly deduced the Iraqi reactor to be the most probable target. Hussein immediately contacted his government and ordered a warning to be sent to the Iraqis. However, due to a communication failure the message was never received and the Israeli planes entered Iraqi airspace undetected.^[60]

Upon reaching Iraqi airspace the squadron split up, with two of the F-15s forming close escort to the F-16 squadron, and the remaining F-15s dispersing into Iraqi airspace as a diversion and ready back-up. The attack squadron descended to 30 m over the Iraqi desert, attempting to fly under the radar of the Iraqi defences.^[60]

At 18:35 local time (14:35 GMT), 20 km from the Osirak reactor complex, the F-16 formation climbed to 2,100 m and went into a 35-degree dive at 1,100 km/h, aimed at the reactor complex. At 1,100 m, the F-16s began releasing the Mark 84 bombs in pairs, at 5-second intervals.^[60] At least eight of the sixteen released bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor.^[58] It was later revealed that half an hour before the Israeli planes arrived, a group of Iraqi soldiers manning anti-aircraft defenses had left their posts for an afternoon meal, turning off their radars.^[43] The Israeli planes were still intercepted by Iraqi defenses but managed to evade the remaining anti-aircraft fire.^[43] The squadron climbed to high altitude and started their return to Israel. The attack lasted less than two minutes.^[53] According to Ze'ev Raz, the leader of the attack force, the Israeli pilots radioed each other and recited the biblical verse Joshua 10:12 as they were returning to the base.^[70]

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REACTIONS

See also: 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 487

IAF F-16A Netz 107 with Osirak bombing mark.

International response at the United Nations took two paths. The United Nations Security Council issued a unanimous and almost immediate response on 19 June 1981, following eight meetings and statements from Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Security Council Resolution 487^[15] strongly condemned the attack as a "clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct" and called on Israel to refrain from such attacks in the future; the Council recognised the right of Iraq to "establish programmes of technological and nuclear development" and called for Israel to join Iraq within the "IAEA safeguards regime" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.^[71] The Council also stated its consideration that Iraq was "entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered." The United States voted for the resolution and suspended the delivery of four F-16 aircraft to Israel, but blocked punitive action by the UN.^[72][73] The suspension on the delivery of the aircraft was lifted two months later.^[74][75]

The UN General Assembly followed the Security Council with Resolution No. 36/27 on 13 November 1981, expressing deep alarm and condemning Israel over the "premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression," and demanding that Israel pay prompt and adequate compensation for the damage and loss of life it had caused.^[76] The resolution also solemnly warned Israel to refrain from taking such measures in the future.^[76]

Debate prior to passage of the UN resolution reflected member states' differing positions on issues such as nuclear proliferation in the region and the appropriateness and justifiability of Israel's actions. The Iraqi representative stated that "the motives behind the Israeli attack were to cover up Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and, more importantly, the determination not to allow the Arab nation to acquire scientific or technical knowledge."^[34]Syria requested condemnation not only of Israel for terrorism against Arab peoples, but also of the United States, "which continue[s] to provide Israel with instruments of destruction as part of its strategic alliance."^[77]

The representative of France stated that the sole purpose of the reactor was scientific research.^[34] Agreements between France and Iraq excluded military use.^[34] The United Kingdom said it did not believe Iraq had the capacity to manufacture fissionable materials for nuclear weapons.^[34] The IAEA Director-General confirmed that inspections of the nuclear research reactors near Baghdad revealed no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement.^[34]

The IAEA's Board of Governors convened on 9–12 June and condemned Israel's action.^[78] The Board further asked that the prospect of suspending Israel's privileges and rights of membership be considered at the next General Conference held by the organization.^[78] On 26 September 1981, the IAEA Conference condemned the attack and voted to suspend all technical assistance to Israel.^[78] A draft resolution was introduced to expel Israel from the IAEA, but the proposition was defeated.^[78] The United States argued that the attack was not a violation of the IAEA Statute and that punitive action against Israel would do great harm to the IAEA and the non-proliferation regime.^[78]

The attack was strongly criticized around the world, including in the United States.^[72][79] Jonathan Steele, writing in The Guardian, described the reaction:

"The world was outraged by Israel's raid on 7 June 1981. 'Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach of international law,' Margaret Thatcher thundered. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain's then prime minister, described it as 'shocking' and compared it to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome. 'Israel's sneak attack ... was an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression,' said the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times called it 'state-sponsored terrorism'."^[14]

AFTERMATH

Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel and in charge of the operation, disembarks from an aircraft upon his arrival in the United States, accompanied by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan.

Ten Iraqi soldiers and one French civilian were killed in the attack.^[12] The civilian killed was engineer Damien Chaussepied, variously described as 24 or 25 years old, who was an employee of Air Liquide and the French governmental agency CEA.^[80][81][82] In 1981, Israel agreed to pay restitution to Chaussepied's family.^[82]

Iraq said it would rebuild the facility and France agreed, in principle, to aid in the reconstruction.^[83] Because of a mix of factors, including the Iran–Iraq War, international pressure and Iraqi payment problems, negotiations broke down in 1984 and France withdrew from the project.^[47][84] The Osirak facility remained in its damaged state until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was completely destroyed by subsequent coalition air strikes by the United States Air Force, one of them being the Package Q Strike.^[85] During the war, 100 out of 120 members of the Knesset signed a letter of appreciation to Menachem Begin, thanking him for ordering the attack on Osirak.^[86] In July 1991, Begin, in a rare interview granted to Israel Army Radio, claimed that the Gulf War, and especially the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel during that war, vindicated his decision to bomb the reactor.^[87]

In response to their failures to prevent the Osirak attack (and the earlier H-3 attack), Saddam Hussein ordered the execution of the head of Iraq's Western Air Defense Zone, Colonel Fakhri Hussein Jaber and all officers under his command above the rank of major. In addition, 23 other Iraqi pilots and officers were imprisoned.^[55]

The attack took place approximately three weeks before the Israeli legislative election of 1981. Opposition leader Shimon Peres criticized the operation as a political ploy, which did not go over well with the electorate.^[13] Dan Perry writes that "the Osirak bombing—and Peres's poor political judgement in criticizing it—were crucial in turning the tide of what initially had seemed to be a hopeless election campaign for Likud".^[13] Begin responded to Peres's accusation at a Likud rally: "Jews, you have known me for forty years, since I lived in the Hassidoff neighborhood of Petah Tikva to fight for the Jewish people (a reference to Begin's incognito days in the Irgun). Would I send Jewish boys to risk death—or captivity worse than death, because those barbarians would have tortured our boys horribly—for elections?" 

On 30 June, Likud was reelected over Peres's Alignment party, winning by just one seat in the Knesset.^[13]

In 2009, the Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki demanded that Israel compensate Iraq for the destruction of the reactor.^[88] An Iraqi official asserted that Iraq's right to redress is supported by Resolution 487 adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to the attack.^[88] In early 2010, The Siasat Daily, citing an unnamed Iraqi parliament member, reported that Iraqi officials had received word from the UN Secretariat that the Iraqi government is entitled to seek compensation from Israel for damage caused by the attack.^[89]

  ASSESSMENT

Israel claims that the attack impeded Iraq's nuclear ambitions by at least ten years.^[17] In an interview in 2005, Bill Clinton expressed support for the attack: "everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osiraq, in 1981, which, I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam from developing nuclear power."^[90] Louis René Beres wrote in 1995 that "[h]ad it not been for the brilliant raid at Osiraq, Saddam's forces might have been equipped with atomic warheads in 1991."^[91]

In 2010, squad leader Ze'ev Raz said of the operation: "There was no doubt in the mind of the decision makers that we couldn't take a chance. We knew that the Iraqis could do exactly what we did in Dimona."^[92]

As early as the autumn of 1981, Kenneth Waltz discussed the fallout from the strike:

In striking Iraq, Israel showed that a preventive strike can be made, something that was not in doubt. Israel's act and its consequences however, make clear that the likelihood of useful accomplishment is low. Israel's strike increased the determination of Arabs to produce nuclear weapons. Arab states that may attempt to do so will now be all the more secretive and circumspect. Israel's strike, far from foreclosing Iraq's nuclear future, gained her the support of some other Arab states in pursuing it. And despite Prime Minister Begin's vow to strike as often as need be, the risks in doing so would rise with each occasion.^[93]

Charles R. H. Tripp, in an interview for the 25th anniversary of the attack, described the bombing of Osirak as a variation of Israeli military doctrine beginning with the premiership of David Ben-Gurion, "advocating devastating pre-emptive strikes on Arab enemies."^[94]Tripp asserted, "the Osirak attack is an illegal way to behave—Resolution 487 established that—but it is an understandable way to behave if you are the Israeli military-security establishment."^[94]

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, American forces captured a number of documents detailing conversations that Saddam Hussein had with his inner sanctum.^[95] In a 1982 conversation Hussein stated that, "Once Iraq walks out victorious [over Iran], there will not be any Israel." Of Israel's anti-Iraqi endeavors he noted, "Technically, they [the Israelis] are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq."^[95]

Tom Moriarty, a military intelligence analyst for the United States Air Force, wrote in 2004 that Israel had "gambled that the strike would be within Iraq's threshold of tolerance." Moriarty argues that Iraq, already in the midst of a war with Iran, would not start a war with Israel at the same time and that its "threshold of tolerance was higher than normal."^[96]

Joseph Cirincione, then director of non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in 2006:

Israel had pulled off a remarkable military raid, striking targets with great precision over long distances. But the bombing set back Israel more than Iraq. It further harmed Israel's international reputation, later worsened by the ill-fated 1982 invasion of Lebanon, while making Iraq appear a victim of Israeli aggression.^[61]

By contrast, Iraqi researchers have stated that the Iraqi nuclear program simply went underground, diversified, and expanded.^[97] Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi nuclear scientist, made the following statement in an interview on CNN's Crossfire in 2003:

Israel—actually, what Israel [did] is that it got out the immediate danger out of the way. But it created a much larger danger in the longer range. What happened is that Saddam ordered us—we were 400 ... scientists and technologists running the program. And when they bombed that reactor out, we had also invested $400 million. And the French reactor and the associated plans were from Italy. When they bombed it out we became 7,000 with a $10 billion investment for a secret, much larger underground program to make bomb material by enriching uranium. We dropped the reactor out totally, which was the plutonium for making nuclear weapons, and went directly into enriching uranium. ... They [Israel] estimated we'd make 7 kg [15 lb] of plutonium a year, which is enough for one bomb. And they get scared and bombed it out. Actually it was much less than this, and it would have taken a much longer time. But the program we built later in secret would make six bombs a year.^[97]

Similarly, the Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri wrote in 2003 that the bombing of Osirak convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full-fledged nuclear weapons program.^[98] United States Secretary of Defense William Perry stated in 1997 that Iraq refocused its nuclear weapons effort on producing highly enriched uranium after the raid.^[99] Its interest in acquiring plutonium as fissile material for weapons continued, but at a lower priority.^[99]

In the Duelfer Report, released by the Iraq Survey Group in 2004, it is stated that the Iraqi nuclear program "expanded considerably" with the purchase of the French reactor in 1976, and that "Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the early 1980s."^[100]

Bob Woodward, in the book State of Denial, writes:

Israeli intelligence were convinced that their strike in 1981 on the Osirak nuclear reactor about 10 miles outside Baghdad had ended Saddam's program. Instead [it initiated] covert funding for a nuclear program code-named 'PC3' involving 5.000 people testing and building ingredients for a nuclear bomb.^[101]

Richard K. Betts wrote that "there is no evidence that Israel's destruction of Osirak delayed Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The attack may actually have accelerated it."^[102] Dan Reiter has repeatedly said^[103][104] that the attack was a dangerous failure: the bombed reactor had nothing to do with weapons research, while "the attack may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons."^[104] In 2011, and basing herself on new Iraqi sources, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer said that the attack: "...triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist ... a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. This case suggests that preventive attacks can increase the long-term proliferation risk posed by the targeted state."^[105]Elsewhere, she wrote:

The destruction of the Osiraq reactor did not delay the development of a nuclear weapons option because it [the reactor] was never intended to be part of such an effort. The French-supplied facility was subject to rigorous safeguards and designed to ensure that Iraq would not be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium. An examination of the reactor by Harvard physicist Richard Wilson after the attack concluded that the facility was not suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium. As a result, the attack did not reduce the risk that Iraq would develop nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it brought about a far more determined and focused effort to acquire nuclear weapons.^[106]

In 2012, it was similarly argued by scholars at the RAND Corporation that an "Israeli or American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would make it more, not less, likely that the Iranian regime would decide to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. Such an attack would also make it more, not less, difficult to contain Iranian influence."^[107]

Following Desert Storm, Dick Cheney thanked the Israeli mission commander for the "outstanding job he did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981". While many scholars debate the value of the bombing, Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons at the outbreak of the Gulf War, and, according to Cheney, the bombing made Desert Storm easier.^[108]

See also

• Operation Wooden Leg – the Israeli Air Force's raid on Tunisia
• Operation Orchard – the Israeli airstrike on a purported Syrian nuclear target
• Stuxnet
• France–Iraq relations
• French support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war
• Operation Scorch Sword - an Iranian air strike that damaged the Osirak nuclear reactor on 30 September 1980
• Iraq–Israel relations
• Nuclear weapons and Israel